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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal are Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis and the Davis 
County Clerk, Steve S. Rawlings. In its original complaint in this case, the Davis County 
Commission and the individual Davis County Commissioners were named as co-defendants. 
(R. 1.) However, the Commission and Commissioners were dismissed as parties by the trial 
court (R. 280, Br. of Appellant Addendum tab 1), and no appeal was taken from that order 
of dismissal. 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Memorandum Decision and Order of the Second Judicial 
District Court, Hon. Glen R. Dawson, denying the motion of plaintiff-appellant Utahns for 
Better Dental Health-Davis ("UBDH") for an award of attorney fees, sought after UBDH 
prevailed in a lawsuit against the Davis County Clerk, Steve S. Rawlings ("Clerk Rawlings"). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court properly deny UBDH's motion to award attorney fees, 
sought under the "private attorney general" exception to the American rule that 
litigants pay their own attorney fees, after UBDH prevailed in its underlying litigation 
against Clerk Rawlings? 
1 
A trial court's decision whether to award attorney fees to a prevailing litigant is 
reviewed deferentially upon appeal for abuse of discretion. Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44 
If 6,100 P.3d 1151,1155-56 ("private attorney general" rationale);//wg/wtf v. Cafferty,2004 
UT 22 ffif 4, 8 n.2, 89 P.3d 148, 152, 153 n.2 (general equitable rule). However, in this case 
UBDH argues that the trial court applied incorrect legal standards to the exercise of its 
discretion. The question whether a trial court has applied correct legal standards is reviewed 
on appeal without deference. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-39 (Utah 1994). 
II. Did the trial court properly deny UBDH's motion for attorney fees under the 
"private attorney general" theory, despite certain findings and conclusions entered in 
its decision on the merits of the underlying controversy? 
Inasmuch as this issue entails interpretation of the trial court's written ruling on the 
merits of the underlying controversy, as well as its ruling on the attorney fees motion, it 
appears to present a question of law. However, a trial court's prerogative to revisit prior 
findings, when invoked for a different legal purpose, appears to be a matter of discretion, to 
be deferentially reviewed on appeal. 
Clerk Rawlings respectfully submits, as an alternative ground to affirm, the following 
additional issue: 
III. Should this Court overrule its endorsement of the "private attorney general" 
exception to the American rule that parties to a lawsuit pay their own attorney fees? 
Because this issue can only be decided by this Court, it is reviewed de novo, as a matter of 
2 
law. This issue, offered as an alternative ground to affirm, was not raised in the trial court. 
However, because the trial court has no power to overturn precedent established by this 
Court, it would have been futile to raise this issue below. A "substantial burden" rests upon 
a party seeking to overturn appellate precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 
1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule authorizes the award of attorney fees to 
a prevailing litigant, in Utah, in a case such as this one. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a political dispute about whether the public drinking water in 
Davis County should contain fluoride. During the general election of November 2000, Davis 
County voters approved fluoridation. However, fluoride opponents sought a "re-vote" on the 
issue for the 2002 election, and circulated an "initiative petition" for signature by Davis 
County voters. Upon confirming that the petition contained the legally-requisite number of 
signatures, and after the Davis County Commission took no action on the petition, Clerk 
Rawlings prepared to place the fluoride "re-vote" on the 2002 election ballot. (R. 278.) 
By lawsuit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, filed in the Second District 
Court, UBDH opposed placement of the fluoride "re-vote" on the 2002 ballot. (R. 1, 275-
76.) UBDH prevailed on the underlying merits of that "re-vote lawsuit," persuading the trial 
court that the re-vote "initiative" was, in substance, really a referendum, which had not been 
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timely filed under the governing statute. Therefore, the trial court granted an injunction that 
barred Clerk Rawlings from placing the re-vote on the 2002 ballot. (R. 274-85, Appellant's 
Addendum tab l.)1 
UBDH then filed a motion asking the trial court to order Clerk Rawlings, as the non-
prevailing party, to pay UBDH's attorney fees. As grounds for that motion, UBDH asserted 
the "private attorney general" exception to the usual American rule that, absent statutory or 
contractual authority, litigants pay their own attorney fees. Following an evidentiary hearing, 
briefing, and argument on that issue, the trial court entered an order denying UBDH's 
motion. (R. 852-56.) 
UBDH appealed the denial of its motion for attorney fees. The Utah Court of Appeals 
remanded, holding that the trial court's order denying attorney fees had been inadequately 
supported by fact findings and legal conclusions. In particular, the court of appeals held that 
the trial court had uintermingle[d]" elements of several exceptions for awarding attorney fees, 
and had not focused upon the "private attorney general" exception advocated by UBDH. 
Utahnsfor Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Comm yn et al, 2005 UT App 
347 \ 9, 121 P.3d 39, 42 ("UBDHF). Post-remand, the trial court re-analyzed the attorney 
fee issue, and entered a new Memorandum Decision and Order in February 2006 , again 
1The trial court's decision included a ruling that UBDH had standing to bring its 
lawsuit, and also a ruling that the Davis County Commission and individual 
commissioners, named as co-defendants, were not proper parties and would be dismissed. 
(R. 278-80.) 
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again denying UBDH's motion for attorney fees. (R. 899-910, copied in Appendix A of this 
brief.) This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In accord with Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111 (2000), part of Utah's Safe Drinking 
Water Act, the Davis County Commission passed a resolution to place the following "opinion 
question" on the November 2000 general election ballot: "Should fluoride be added to the 
public water supplies in Davis County?" (R. 277, Appellant's Addendum tab 1.) 
UBDH, a Utah non-profit corporation advocating the benefits of fluoridation, has 
claimed credit, via its advocacy to the Utah Legislature and the Davis County Commission, 
for placing the opinion question on the 2000 ballot. (R. 101-08, Affidavit of Beth Q. Beck, 
Appendix B of this brief.) 
Davis County voters, by a 52% to 48% margin, answered "yes" to the opinion 
question regarding fluoride. (R. 277, Appellant's Addendum tab 1.) Accordingly, and as 
provided by code section 19-4-111(2), the Davis County Health Department ordered public 
drinking water systems in Davis County to begin the process of adding fluoride to the water. 
(R. 277.) 
Six months after the 2000 general election, fluoride opponents submitted a document 
styled as an "Initiative Petition" to Clerk Rawlings. The "Initiative Petition," and its cover 
letter to the Clerk, made plain that the intent of its sponsors was to obtain a "Re-vote on 
Mandatory Fluoridation Act." (R. 804-06 Exh. 10, Appellant's Addendum tab 9.) Clerk 
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Rawlings had previously informed the fluoride opponents that "if all applicable election law 
requirements are met related to the filing of the petition it may be accepted by my office as 
a qualified countywide initiative petition." (R. 804-06 Exh. 9, Appendix C of this brief, 
emphasis added.) 
After Clerk Rawlings supplied statutorily-required paperwork, the "re-vote petition" 
was circulated by the fluoride opponents, and by mid-2002, 9,650 registered Davis County 
voters signed it. Clerk Rawlings and other elected county officials were among those who 
signed the re-vote petition. The signed petition was filed with Clerk Rawlings. In early July 
2002, Clerk Rawlings informed the Davis County Commission that the re-vote petition had 
garnered enough voter signatures to advance. The Commission then referred the petition to 
the Davis County Attorney for a legal opinion. (R. 804-06 Exh. 13, Appellant's Addendum 
tab 11.) 
In late July 2002, counsel for UBDH sent a letter to the Davis County Attorney 
(Described in Br. of Appellant p. 8.), setting forth UBDH's opinion that the re-vote petition 
was not a valid initiative measure under Utah law. Instead, UBDH argued, a re-vote on the 
fluoridation issue could only be had via referendum, not via initiative. Arguing that the re-
vote petition was untimely as a referendum, UBDH urged the County Attorney that it should 
not appear on the 2002 general election ballot. However, the County Attorney concluded 
that the re-vote petition was legally sufficient to appear on the ballot, and so informed the 
Commission at its August 2002 meeting. (Plaintiff s Exh. 1, Appellant's Addendum tab 13.) 
e 
Rather than either adopt or reject the petition, the County Commission took no action. 
(Appellant's Addendum tab 13.) Accordingly, by operation of law governing local 
initiatives, Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-501 (3)(d)(ii) (2002), Clerk Rawlings began preparations 
to place the fluoride re-vote question on the November 2002 general election ballot. 
UBDH promptly sued Clerk Rawlings, to bar the fluoride re-vote from the 2002 
ballot. In its complaint (R. 1-10), UBDH asserted that the re-vote petition was in substance 
really a local referendum, and not an initiative. Therefore, argued UBDH, because the signed 
re-vote petition had not been filed within 35 days after voter approval of the November 2000 
opinion question, the re-vote petition was time-barred under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-
601(3)(a) (2002) (Appendix D of this brief), governing local referenda. 
In a memorandum to the trial court supporting its motion for a preliminary injunction, 
UBDH stated that its complaint raised "serious issues of constitutional and statutory law, 
some of which are matters of first impression." (R. 30.) 
In opposition to UBDH's motion, Clerk Rawlings, via the Davis County Attorney, 
conceded that if the re-vote petition was a referendum, it was time-barred under section 20A-
7-601(3)(a). However, he then argued that the voters' affirmative answer to the 2000 
fluoride "opinion question" really did not constitute a local "law" that was subject to repeal 
by referendum. Instead, he argued, the fluoride re-vote was permissible under Utah Code 
Ann. § 20A-7-501 (2002) (Appendix D of this brief), governing local initiatives, which does 
not contain the 35-day time requirement for referenda. (R. 79-85, Appendix E of this brief.) 
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After briefing, a consolidated preliminary injunction hearing and trial on the merits 
was held in September 2002. UBDH prevailed on re-vote issue. (R. 276.) The trial court 
agreed with UBDH that the fluoride opponents' re-vote petition was properly construed as 
a referendum, not as an initiative. As such, the re-vote petition had been untimely filed under 
section 20A-7-601(3). Accordingly, the trial court granted an injunction barring Clerk 
Rawlings from placing the fluoride re-vote on the 2002 ballot. (R. 275-86, Appellant's 
Addendum tab 1.) 
UBDH then advanced its motion for attorney fees. The attorney fee motion was 
briefed by the parties, and an evidentiary hearing was held in August 2003. At that hearing, 
the trial court heard testimony from several individuals who had been involved in the re-vote 
controversy, including Clerk Rawlings and deputy Davis County Attorney Gerald Hess. (R. 
874, transcript of hearing.) 
The following day, the trial court convened a telephone conference to announce its 
decision. (Telephone conference transcript, R. 875, Appendix F of this brief.) The trial court 
announced that it was denying UBDH's motion for attorney fees. In the course of that 
announcement, the court commented, regarding its ruling on the underlying re-vote 
controversy, "that people in good faith could disagree about that decision." (R. 875 p. 4.) 
The court observed that the relevant section of the Safe Drinking Water Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 19-4-111 (2003), had recently been amended to clarify procedures for adding or removing 
fluoride from local drinking water. (The 2003 version, copied with the 2002 version in 
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Appendix G of this brief, authorizes addition or removal of fluoride via initiative, but not 
more often than every four years.) The court acknowledged that Clerk Rawlings "had some 
views about the issue of fluoridation," but expressly found that he had "acted appropriately 
in good faith" with regard to the re-vote petition. (R. 875 p. 5.) Nor, the court added, was 
there any evidence that Clerk Rawlings had abdicated his duties or acted out of bias or 
prejudice. (R. 875 p. 5-6.) 
Subsequently, the trial court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order denying UBDH's motion for attorney fees. (R. 852-57, Appellant's Addendum tab 2.) 
After those findings and conclusions were found insufficient by the Utah Court of Appeals 
in UBDH /, the issue was remanded to the trial court. In February 2006, the trial court 
entered a new Memorandum Decision and Order, explaining its reasoning in more detail, and 
again denying UBDH's motion for attorney fees. (R. 899-910, Appendix A of this brief.) 
This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court did not commit legal error in its analysis of the "private attorney 
general" rationale offered by UBDH in its motion for an award of attorney fees. To the 
contrary, the trial court properly analyzed that motion under the three factors described in this 
Court's 1994 Stewart v. Public Service Comm'n decision. The court also properly took 
guidance from the California Supreme Court's 1977 Serrano v. Priest decision, which this 
Court had followed in Stewart. The trial court, in its application of the prescribed factors, 
9 
did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, its denial of UBDH's motion for attorney fees should 
be affirmed. 
II. Nor did the trial court's Ruling on the underlying "re-vote" dispute bind the court 
to award attorney fees under the "private attorney general" rationale. In its post-remand 
Memorandum Decision, the court specified that its findings regarding attorney fees were 
specific to that issue, and would trump any seemingly contradictory statements in the re-vote 
Ruling. Even if the court were bound by certain statements in that underlying Ruling, such 
statements applied only to the first factor of the "private attorney general" analysis-whether 
UBDH had vindicated an "important public policy." Neither of the other two required 
factors in the "private attorney general" analysis were addressed in the underlying Ruling, 
and those factors were properly considered for the first time when the court addressed the 
attorney fee issue. 
III. As an alternative ground for affirming the trial court's judgment, this Court 
should revisit and overrule its 1994 endorsement, in Stewart, of the "private attorney general" 
rationale for awarding attorney fees to a prevailing litigant. As demonstrated by this case, 
and as observed by courts in other jurisdictions that have rejected it, the "private attorney 
general" theory is vaguely-defined, and invites courts to become unnecessarily embroiled in 
contentious political debates. This Court's endorsement of the "private attorney general" 





THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED UBDH's MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. The Trial Court Applied Correct Legal Standards to Determine whether 
UBDH Was Entitled to Attorney Fees under the "Private Attorney General" 
Doctrine. 
Utah follows the American rule that the prevailing party to a lawsuit bears its own 
attorney fees, unless otherwise provided by statute or contract. Stewart v. Public Service 
Comm % 885 P.2d 759,782 (Utah 1994). There are, however, several exceptions to the rule, 
as explained by this Court in Stewart, They are: (1) "bad faith" by the opposing party; (2) 
the "common fund" exception (financial benefit won); (3) the "substantial benefit" exception 
(nonfinancial but important benefit won); (4) and "violation of trust." Stewart, 885 P.2d at 
782-83.2 Also in Stewart, this Court endorsed an additional exception permitting the award 
of attorney fees to a prevailing litigant—(5) the "private attorney general" exception. Id. at 
783. 
In this case, the trial court considered, and rejected, the first four of the above 
potential justifications for an award of attorney fees. On appeal, UBDH does not argue that 
2The "bad faith" exception is authorized by Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56 (2002; enacted 1981), although this Court in Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782, attributed that 
exception to the courts' "inherent equitable power." The "common fund" and 
"substantial benefit" theories have been described as closely related, the latter an 
"outgrowth" of the former. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 n.18 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 
Cal.3d 25, 38, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309 (1977)). 
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the trial court abused its discretion, or otherwise erred, in its analysis and rejection of those 
four exceptions to the rule that litigants pay their own attorney fees. (R. 906-909.) Indeed, 
UBDH forthrightly asserts that its "only basis" for seeking attorney fees is the "private 
attorney general" exception. (Br. of Appellant p. 16.) By that assertion, UBDH has 
expressly waived a claim to attorney fees under any of the first four exceptions to the 
American rule. 
In approving the "private attorney general" exception in Stewart, this Court 
approvingly cited Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25,141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977). 
In Serrano, the California Supreme Court awarded attorney fees, under the "private attorney 
general" exception, to a group of private litigants who had proven that a statutory method of 
funding school systems violated the California Constitution. The "private attorney general" 
exception, as outlined by this Court in Stewart, and later in Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 
100 P.3d 1151, applies when three factors are satisfied: (1) the underlying lawsuit 
"vindicate^] an important public policy;" (2) the costs of vindicating the important policy 
"transcend[s] the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization;" and (3) the circumstances of the case are "exceptional" or "extraordinary" in 
nature. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783 & n.19; Shipman, 2004 UT 44 \ 4, 100 P.3d at 1155. 
Describing the third factor, this Court has stressed that "[a] wards of attorney fees under the 
12 
private attorney general doctrine are to be dispensed sparingly." Shipman, 2004 UT 44 f 5, 
100 P.3d at 1155 (citing Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783 n.19).3 
In this case, UBDH accuses the trial court of importing, into the "private attorney 
general" exception, the first four exceptions to the rule: 
Having ultimately held that Plaintiff had not qualified for a fee award under any other 
exception to the general rule, the court then held that the private attorney general 
exception should not apply because Plaintiff had not satisfied any of the other 
exceptions; and therefore, the instant case was not "extraordinary" as contemplated 
in Stewart's footnote 19. 
(Br. of Appellant at 16-17, emphasis in original.) UBDH thereby implicitly invokes State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-39 (Utah 1994), wherein this Court explained that a trial court's 
exercise of discretionary judgment is confined by legal standards, or boundaries, that are 
reviewed on appeal without deference. 
UBDH's accusation is inaccurate. It is true that the trial court considered each 
potential exception supporting UBDH's attorney fee claim separately, even though UBDH 
advanced only the "private attorney general" exception. (R. 902-906.) Because UBDH did 
not seek attorney fees under the first four exceptions, it was arguably unnecessary for the trial 
3ln Serrano, the California Supreme Court outlined the factors as: "(1) the strength 
or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity 
for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, (3) the 
number of people standing to benefit from the decision." Without explanation, the 
California court re-cast the second factor as an inquiry into whether "the necessary costs 
of securing this result transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent 
requiring subsidization," 20 Cal.3d at 45, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 569 P.2d at 1314, the 
formulation later approved in Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783. 
13 
court to consider them. However, it is more reasonable to conclude that the trial court acted 
on the side of caution and thoroughness, by considering all potential, alternative exceptions 
to the rule that litigants pay their own attorney fees. To ignore those alternatives could have 
exposed the trial court to a claim of "plain error" on appeal. 
In accord with Stewart, the trial court then specifically identified the three factors for 
analysis of the "private attorney general" exception: 
The court's award of attorney fees in this category is considered when the 
'"vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes place and 'the 
necessary costs in doing so transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to 
an extent requiring subsidization.'" . . . In granting attorney fees under this doctrine 
the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart noted the limited applicability of this category. 
It said, "[W]e note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that any future 
award of attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary case." 
(R. 906, internal citations omitted.) The trial court then analyzed whether each of these 
Stewart factors had been satisfied. See R. 908 ("important public policy"); R. 908-09 
(whether costs "transcend individual plaintiff s pecuniary interest); R. 909 (whether case was 
"exceptional"). 
It is true that certain "private attorney general" factors overlap with other exceptions 
to the American rule that litigants pay their own attorney fees. For example, the "substantial 
benefit" exception for awarding attorney fees overlaps with the "important public policy" 
factor for analyzing the "private attorney general" exception, because both entail a court's 
subjective weighing of the benefit won by the prevailing litigant. Also, in this case, the trial 
court overlapped the "bad faith" exception with the "exceptional/extraordinary" factor of the 
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"private attorney general" exception. (R. 909.) Inasmuch as "bad faith" is a rare exception 
to the usual conduct of litigation, it seems appropriate to include the presence or absence of 
bad faith within the analysis of the third "private attorney general" factor. 
Such overlap is not unusual, particularly when the court, as in this case, is grappling 
with a relatively new and broadly-defined legal doctrine. The first two Stewart factors for 
application of the "private attorney general" exception appear to invite a wide-ranging 
inquiry. A fair reading of the trial court's decision demonstrates that its rejection of the first 
four exceptions for awarding attorney fees did not control its decision to reject the "private 
attorney general" exception. The trial court merely recognized that aspects of the first four 
exceptions also applied to the "private attorney general" factors. The trial court did not stray 
beyond the prescribed legal boundaries for making its decision on UBDH's motion for 
attorney fees. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in its Denial of Attorney Fees 
to UBDH under the "Private Attorney General" Doctrine. 
Because the trial court applied correct legal standards, its decision that the "private 
attorney general" exception did not apply to UBDH is subject to highly deferential appellate 
review: 
Because we review this holding under an abuse of discretion standard, we will not 
undertake our own assessment of whether plaintiffs vindicated a public policy, nor 
will we attempt to gauge anew the importance of any vindicated policy, nor will we 
tackle the question of whether plaintiffs' actions were comparable to those we found 
"extraordinary" in Stewart. Instead, we review the trial court's determination that an 
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equitable reward was not merited here only to see if the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
Shipman, 2004 UT 44 \ 6, 100 P.3d at 1156. 
As follows, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its analysis of the three 
Stewart factors in the "private attorney general" exception. At various junctures in its brief, 
UBDH accuses the trial court of legal errors, other than the accusation addressed in Point I-A 
of this brief, in considering the three factors. Those additional accusations will be addressed 
herein, under the analysis of each factor. 
(1) No Vindication of Important Public Policy. 
The trial court recognized that "the people's right to directly legislate through 
initiative and referendum is an important and fundamental right " (R. 908, Appendix A 
of this brief.) Accord Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89 ^ 23-24, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080-81. 
However, the trial court reasonably noted that the main issue in the underlying lawsuit had 
been whether the fluoride re-vote petition was a referendum or an initiative. (R. 908.) The 
trial court found itself "not inclined to conclude that the mere interpretation of a contested 
petition involves 'vindication of a strong or societally important public policy.'" (Id.) 
Beyond repeating its mantra that direct legislation via initiative is an important and 
fundamental right, UBDH does not really challenge the trial court's characterization of the 
underlying controversy: whether the anti-fluoride petition was an "initiative" or whether it 
was an untimely "referendum." Both of these forms of direct legislation have been 
characterized as "fundamental" under the Utah Constitution, e.g., Gallivan v. Walker, supra. 
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In this case, whichever side prevailed on the "initiative versus referendum" dispute, the 
losing side could argue that it had been denied its "important and fundamental right" to 
legislate directly. (R. 905-06.) Indeed, the trial court's decision to banish the fluoride re-
vote from the ballot did stop that re-vote from being submitted to the democratic process. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by recognizing this paradox. In its decision on the 
re-vote issue, the trial court simply chose one public policy (preserving legislation not timely 
challenged by referendum) over another (permitting direct legislation by initiative). 
The trial court also commented: "[T]he fact that plaintiff accomplished personal 
interests by pursuing this matter disinclines the Court from finding that this ['important 
public policy'] factor has been met." (R. 908.) The precise meaning of that comment is 
unclear. However, it is quite apparent that UBDH accomplished its political interest by 
keeping the fluoride re-vote off the 2002 ballot. Through its political advocacy in 2000, 
UBDH obtained public approval of fluoride, via a 52 percent to 48 percent margin. Through 
its litigation advocacy in 2002, UBDH protected that close-won 2000 political victory. To 
the extent the trial court meant to comment on the pursuit of UBDH's political interest via 
litigation, it did not abuse its discretion by weighing the political aspect of UBDH's 
accomplishment against the "important public policy" factor. 
(2) "Individual Pecuniary Interest" not Transcended. 
Turning to the question whether "the necessary costs" of the underlying lawsuit 
"transcended the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
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subsidization," the trial court followed this Court's Stewart decision. However, the court 
also took guidance from Serrano v. Priest, supra, the California case that this Court relied 
upon in Stewart. In Serrano, the California Supreme Court first described this second factor 
as "the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the 
plaintiff," 20 Cal.3d at 45, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 569 P.2d at 1314, a description that seems 
fairly straightforward. Without explanation, the California court then re-cast this factor to 
the relatively confusing formulation: whether "the necessary costs of securing this result 
transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization." 
Id. In Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783, this Court adopted the "transcend" formulation. 
UBDH approvingly cites the California court's "necessity and burden" formulation 
of this second "private attorney general" factor. (Br. of Appellant p. 23, quoting Serrano.) 
The trial court in this case utilized Serrano's "necessity and burden" formulation, and found 
that it was not satisfied: 
There was no showing by [UBDH] during the evidentiary hearing of the necessity for 
private enforcement nor of the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff. 
There was no evidence of Plaintiff s ability to pay attorney fees without assistance. 
There was no showing whatsoever of Plaintiffs financial resources or interests. 
There was no showing that the burden placed on Plaintiff in pursuing this litigation, 
even if necessary, was out of proportion to Plaintiffs individual stake in the matter. 
The burden to make such a factual showing was clearly on the Plaintiff. Without a 
sufficient factual showing regarding these matters, attorney fees cannot be allowed. 
(R. 908-909.) 
On appeal, UBDH argues that the trial court erred regarding the "necessity for private 
enforcement," and that its finding of no such necessity "is not supported by the record." 
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According to UBDH, its "private enforcement" of the referendum statute was necessary to 
prevent the fluoride re-vote from being presented to Davis County voters in the 2002 
election. (Br. of Appellant p. 24-25.) But the need for "private enforcement" would have 
vanished had the re-vote appeared on the 2002 ballot and been defeated. Clerk Rawlings so 
argued in his memoranda to the trial court on the merits of the "re-vote" challenge, and in his 
memorandum opposing UBDH's motion for attorney fees. (R. 68-69, 81,329-30.) Because 
the outcome of the re-vote can never be known, the necessity of blocking that re-vote, via 
litigation, can never be ascertained. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, nor commit 
clear error, in finding that such necessity had not been proven.4 
Regarding the trial court's finding that UBDH made no showing addressing its ability 
to pay attorney fees, UBDH does not challenge such finding as either clearly erroneous or 
as an abuse of discretion. Nor could such challenge succeed. In its pleadings to the trial 
court regarding its standing to challenge the re-vote, UBDH claimed individual membership 
of over forty Davis County residents, including physicians, dentists, nurses, and other health 
care professionals. (Affidavit of Beth Q. Beck at R. 103-04, Appendix B of this brief.) 
4It appears that UBDH could have challenged the re-vote post-election, had the re-
vote resulted in disapproval of fluoride. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402 (2003) (grounds 
under which an election result may be challenged); Hardy v. Beaver City, 41 Utah 80, 125 
P. 679, 680 (1912) (election cannot stand if held or conducted in violation of some 
express constitutional or statutory provision); Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 73, 54 P.3d 
1066 (Utah Supreme Court has power under Utah Const. Art. VIII § 3 to issue 
extraordinary writs in election matters); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1, 78-33-12 (2002) 
(declaratory judgment act, including directive that act is to be "liberally construed and 
administered"). 
19 
UBDH also listed over thirty-five "active supporters]" in nearby counties, again including 
many health care professionals. (Id.) 
Thus UBDH, a self-avowed non-profit corporation, formed to advocate the benefits 
of fluoridation (Br. of Appellant p. 5), affirmatively alleged the existence of at least seventy-
five members and "active" supporters. In comparison, the plaintiffs in Stewart consisted of 
six individuals, or "a handful of ratepayers acting entirely on their own." 885 P.2d at 783. 
Under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by weighing, against UBDH, its 
failure to make any evidentiary showing about inability to pay its own attorney fees. 
Rather than argue that the trial court's "ability to pay" finding was erroneous, UBDH 
argues that such finding is not a proper part of the Stewart analysis. The court's 
consideration of ability to pay, argues UBDH, shows a "strained and baldly wrong" 
interpretation of Stewart. (Br. of Appellant p. 25.) UBDH cites the "transcend pecuniary 
interest" formulation of this second "private attorney general" factor, from Stewart, and 
suggests that this formulation does not include ability to pay attorney fees. (Id.) But as 
already explained, the "transcend" formulation is synonymous with the "necessity and 
burden" formulation in Serrano, which UBDH has quoted approvingly to this Court. (Br. 
of Appellant p. 23.) The trial court's analysis of "necessity and burden," therefore, was 
legally proper. The "burden" portion of this formulation quite reasonably contemplates that 
the prevailing litigant's ability to pay its attorney fees may be considered to determine 
whether the second "private attorney general" factor is satisfied. 
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According to UBDH, it should be "inherently obvious that a group of volunteer 
citizens . . . requires subsidization." (Br. of Appellant p. 26.) It seems equally "obvious," 
however, that an incorporated citizens advocacy group, which UBDH undeniably is, must 
necessarily contemplate that it will incur expenses in the course of its advocacy. Therefore, 
the trial court did not commit legal error by considering whether UBDH had shown an 
inability to pay its own attorney fees in accord with the American rule. Nor did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when it determined that absent such showing, UBDH's bid for attorney 
fees was weakened.5 
(3) Underlying Circumstances Not "Exceptional" or "Extraordinary." 
Turning to the last "private attorney general" factor, the trial court determined that the 
underlying "re-vote" challenge in this lawsuit, although "unique" in the court's experience, 
was "not of the exceptional nature or magnitude described in Stewart" (R. 909.) In making 
that determination, the trial court compared the circumstances of the re-vote lawsuit with the 
circumstances in Stewart. 
The court observed, first and without contradiction, that UBDH's lawsuit garnered no 
monetary benefits to UBDH. (R. 909.) UBDH argues that the creation of "monetary 
5UBDH complains that "it is difficult to formulate" what an inquiry into ability to 
pay attorney fees, or "burden," might entail. (Br. of Appellant p. 26.) Because UBDH is 
invoking an exception to the usual rule that litigants pay their own attorney fees, it is 
UBDH's duty to offer proof of the "burden" it incurred in its challenge to the "re-vote." 
As a "Utah nonprofit corporation" (R. 2), UBDH should have accounting and financial 
reporting capabilities that could shed light on its ability, or non-ability, to pay its own 
attorney fees. 
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benefits" has no place in this third "private attorney general" factor. (Br. of Appellant p. 30-
31.) However, this Court's approval of the "private attorney general" exception, in Stewart, 
included its observation that among other things, the prevailing plaintiffs had achieved utility 
rate relief for all ratepayers: 
Here, USWC has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was 
authorized by the Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order to retain 
revenues in excess of a reasonable rate of return. But for plaintiffs' action, all that 
would have been unchallenged, and none of US WC's ratepayers would ever have had 
any relief. 
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783. In fact, the utility rate overcharges, in Stewart, ultimately resulted 
in creation of a ratepayer refund of 4.6 million dollars, including interest. See Barker v. Utah 
Public Service Cornrn'n, 970 P.2d 702, 711 (Utah 1998) (addressing attorney fee issue 
following remand in Stewart). 
While demonstrating an overlap with the "common fund" exception for awarding 
attorney fees, the trial court in this case reasonably considered, as part of the "exceptional or 
extraordinary" factor, whether financial benefit had been gained. The trial court did not, as 
alleged by UBDH (Br. of Appellant p. 29), require a showing of financial benefit to satisfy 
this factor. It considered whether such showing had been made. Doing so was proper in 
light of the above-quoted language in Stewart, and therefore, such consideration was neither 
legally erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. 
In connection with its observation regarding financial benefits to UBDH, the trial 
court also observed that there was no "windfall" to defendant, Clerk Rawlings. That 
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observation compares the pre-lawsuit situation in Stewart with the pre-lawsuit situation in 
this case: in Stewart, US West Communications had been collecting excessive and illegal 
utility rates, thereby gaining a financial windfall. In this case, there is no suggestion that 
Clerk Rawlings, or Davis County, or any of the original defendants in UBDH's lawsuit, ever 
profited financially by allowing the fluoride re-vote to proceed to the 2002 election ballot. 
Quite reasonably, the question whether the losing party had been profiting by pre-lawsuit 
wrongdoing is an appropriate consideration in deciding whether a case is so "exceptional" 
as to justify awarding attorney fees to the winning litigant under the "private attorney 
general" exception. The trial court neither abused its discretion, nor committed legal error, 
by considering the "no windfall" aspect of this case. 
The trial court next observed that it could not "find actual or concrete benefits created 
in this case." (R. 909.) True, the fluoride proponents who successfully blocked the 2002 "re-
vote" had their 2000 efforts protected. But as the trial court noted in its discussion of the 
"substantial benefit" exception, the forty-eight percent of voters who opposed fluoride in 
2000 had reason to believe themselves "disenfranchised" by banishment of the re-vote from 
the 2002 ballot. (R. 906.) Again demonstrating an overlap with the "substantial benefit" 
exception for awarding attorney fees, the trial court's observation regarding "actual or 
concrete benefits" cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. 
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Finally, the trial court determined that Clerk Rawlings' error in authorizing the "re-
vote" to appear on the 2002 election ballot was not on par with the wrongdoing that had 
occurred in Stewart: 
[T]he magnitude and history of the abdication of duties by the Public Service 
Commission found in Stewart are lacking in this case. As the Court has previously 
found, the Davis County Clerk performed his duties in good faith following the advice 
of legal counsel. This is far different from the Stewart findings of a history of 
extraordinary abdication by the Commission of its statutory duties for a number of 
years. 
(R. 909.) This finding by the trial court is not clearly erroneous and does not represent an 
abuse of discretion. In Stewart, governmental agencies charged with approving utility rates 
permitted U.S. West Communications to charge unlawful rates for a period of several years. 
885 P.2d at 766. In this case, Clerk Rawlings was presented with the signed fluoride re-vote 
petition in the summer of 2002 and soon thereafter-in a decision later held to be 
incorrect-authorized the re-vote to appear on the election ballot. By mid-October 2002, the 
trial court had overturned that decision. (R. 275-86.) Thus the wrongdoing attributed to 
Clerk Rawlings lasted no longer than several months. 
The trial court further observed, again without contradiction, that Clerk Rawlings 
received the advice of counsel, to the effect that the re-vote petition was legally sufficient, 
before deciding to place the "re-vote" on the 2002 ballot. (R. 909.) At the evidentiary 
hearing on UBDH's motion for attorney fees, Clerk Rawlings and deputy county attorney 
Gerald Hess both confirmed that legal advice had been sought and received on the question 
whether the re-vote petition would be more likely construed as an initiative or as a 
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referendum. (R. 874 pp. 96-99; 154-55, 161.) Attorney Hess's assessment that the re-vote 
petition could be considered an initiative turned out to be incorrect-but only after the matter 
was litigated. In fact, while announcing its ruling on the attorney fee issue in August 2003, 
the trial court commented that its ruling on the nature of the petition was subject to debate: 
For me as I reviewed the Utah law, this was a case of first impression. It was 
not an easy decision to come to. I believe reasonable minds could have viewed the 
matter otherwise. At this point it appears the legislature has clarified [Utah Code 
section] 19-4- 111. So there may not be a need to test my interpretation in that regard. 
But I do want the record to be clear that while I'm comfortable with my decision, that 
I recognize that in good faith people could differ both as to the interpretation of the 
document entitled revote on - revote on the fluoridation act, and with regard to my 
interpretation of the interplay of the petition statute 2- [sic: to?] 19-4-111. 
(R. 875 p. 4-5, Appendix F of this brief.) UBDH has not argued that attorney Hess's legal 
opinion, to the effect that the re-vote petition could be construed as a lawful initiative, was 
frivolous, i.e., wholly lacking in merit, or made in bad faith. Nor has UBDH argued that the 
above-quoted comments by the trial court were inaccurate. 
To the contrary, those comments were fair. Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111, part of the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, in its 2000-2002 version, provided that fluoride could be added to 
public water supplies upon passage of initiative petitions containing an "opinion question" 
as to whether fluoride should be added. It was silent on the procedure for banning fluoride. 
In its current version, passed in 2003, section 19-4-111 provides that the addition or removal 
of fluoride may be accomplished by initiative, but that such initiatives are permitted no more 
than every four years. (Both versions are copied in Appendix G of this brief.) In 2002, 
however, the trial court had to grapple with the first-impression question of whether an 
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initiative could be used to prohibit fluoride under the Safe Water Act, or whether generic 
statutes governing referenda would apply instead. 
Much of UBDH's argument on the "exceptional case" factor is based upon its premise 
that Clerk Rawlings abdicated a statutory duty to "determine the legality of the petition 
before filing it and certifying it to the County Commission . . . as a lawful initiative." (Br. 
of Appellant p. 20-21.) That premise is false. Under Utah Code Ann. §§20A-7-506(2000) 
and -507 (2002) (Appendix D of this brief), Clerk Rawlings' duty, upon receiving the signed 
"initiative" petition, was to verify that the signers were county residents, at least eighteen 
years old, registered voters, and sufficient in number under other code sections. (The statutes 
governing referenda, sections 20A-7-606 and -607 (2002) (also copied in Appendix D), give 
the clerk these same limited duties.) Clerk Rawlings performed those duties. (Plaintiffs 
Exh. 12, Appellant's Addendum tab 10.) 
Upon confirming that the signatures were sufficient, Clerk Rawlings' duty was 
discharged. Had he then refused to allow the petition to move forward, any voter could have 
applied for an extraordinary writ compelling him to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-
507(5)(a) (2002) (Appendix D). Thus refusing to permit the "re-vote" petition to proceed, 
once the signatures were verified, would have invited a lawsuit against Clerk Rawlings by 
the anti-fluoride advocates who had filed it. Cf Taylor v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 
P.2d 423 (Utah 1998) (local clerk cannot refuse to issue petition for circulation upon the 
ground that subject matter is not appropriate for the initiative process). It seems, then, that 
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Clerk Rawlings was likely to be sued whether or not he allowed the petition to proceed as an 
"initiative." Under such circumstances, it cannot be held that in allowing the petition to 
proceed, he violated any duty; he merely chose his litigation adversary. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion, therefore, in determining that Clerk Rawlings' conduct was not so 
erroneous as to be "extraordinary." 
In a footnote, the trial court also distinguished Stewart from this case based upon this 
Court's holding, in Stewart, that a state statute authorizing a particular utility rate-setting 
procedure was unconstitutional. (R. 909 n.3.) No such holding was reached in this case; 
instead, the trial court held that permitting the "re-vote" to appear on the 2002 ballot would 
violate state constitutional and statutory provisions governing referenda. (R. 281-82.) That 
was certainly a fair distinction to make, in deciding whether "exceptional" or "extraordinary" 
circumstances justified an award of attorney fees under the "private attorney general" 
exception. Once again, in making that distinction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
This Court will not "tackle the question of whether plaintiffs' actions were 
comparable to those we found 'extraordinary' in Stewart" Shipman, 2004 UT 44 ^ J 6, 100 
P.3d at 1156. Instead, so long as the trial court operates within its legal boundaries, and 
adequately articulates its reasoning, its decision on the "private attorney general" issue will 
be left undisturbed under the "abuse of discretion" review standard. As just demonstrated, 
the trial court applied the proper legal standards and did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, 
its rejection of UBDH's attorney fee request should be affirmed. 
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POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY MADE DISTINCT FINDINGS ON THE 
"PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL" EXCEPTION, AND ITS EARLIER 
RULING ON THE "RE-VOTE" ISSUE DID NOT COMPEL THE COURT TO 
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES 
UBDH next argues that the trial court was legally bound by certain statements in its 
written Ruling on the re-vote issue (R. 275-86, Appellant's Addendum tab 1), granting 
injunctive relief and banishing the fluoride re-vote from the 2002 election ballot. UBDH 
points out, for example, that the Ruling included a finding "that the issues presented by 
[UBDH] are of great public importance," and that "[t]his lawsuit raises important and unique 
issues concerning the right of the people to legislate directly." (Br. of Appellant p. 34, 
quoting from R. 280.) UBDH points to other, similar trial court observations elsewhere in 
its re-vote Ruling. (Br. of Appellant p. 34-36.) 
UBDH appears to argue that such statements in the re-vote Ruling legally bound the 
trial court to find that the requirements for awarding attorney fees under the "private attorney 
general" exception were all satisfied. According to UBDH, the trial court "suddenly and 
inexplicably" disavowed those statements during its analysis of the "private attorney general" 
exception. (Br. of Appellant p. 35.) UBDH accuses the trial court of "[i]gnoring and 
abandoning" its findings in the "re-vote" Ruling. (Br. of Appellant p. 36.) Even if those 
characterizations were accurate, UBDH offers neither statutory, rule, nor case law authority 
to explain their legal significance. 
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Furthermore, those characterizations are inaccurate. Review of the trial court's re-
vote Ruling and of its post-remand Memorandum Decision and Order reveals that UBDH has 
exaggerated the significance of the statements in the re-vote Ruling. In the Ruling, the trial 
court specifically reserved the issue of attorney fees for later consideration. (R. 286, 
Appellant's Addendum tab 1.) In its 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order, following 
remand by the court of appeals, the trial court stated: 
This ruling [(on attorney fees)] is based on a review of the applicable case law as 
argued by the parties, the evidence presented in the evidentiary hearing held on 
August 7, 2003, and the factual findings contained in the Court's prior ruling [(the 
"re-vote" Ruling)] entered October 15,2002, which findings are incorporated herein 
by reference. The Court intends that the findings and conclusions in this decision will 
supplant the oral findings and conclusions made on August 8,2003, and the findings, 
conclusions, and order entered October 2,2003. The Court further intends that, to the 
extent the current findings conflict with earlier oral or written pronouncements by this 
Court, this decision should control as it relates to the issue of attorney fees. 
(R. 900, Appellant's Addendum tab 4, emphasis added.) As the above passage reveals, the 
trial court was careful to separate its analysis of the re-vote dispute from its subsequent 
analysis of UBDH's attorney fee motion. It was appropriate for the court to do so5 because 
the merits of the re-vote dispute and of the motion for attorney fees required different 
analyses. 
Even if UBDH were correct about the binding effect of the trial court's Ruling upon 
the attorney fees issue, that argument would only affect the "important public policy" factor 
of the "private attorney general" exception. It would not affect the trial court's discretionary 
judgments regarding the "necessity and burden" (a/k/a "transcend pecuniary interest") and 
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"exceptional or extraordinary case" factors. Indeed, in its brief to this Court, UBDH makes 
no argument that the second and third Stewart factors were also satisfied by the "re-vote" 
Ruling. Instead, UBDH repeats its argument to the effect that its legal challenge to the "re-
vote" vindicated an important public policy, adding an unnecessary discussion of the 
inapplicable "substantial benefit" exception. (Br. of Appellant p. 36-40.) 
As explained in Point One of this brief, even if vindication of an important public 
policy did occur in this case, UBDH still had to satisfy the second and third Stewart factors 
in order to win attorney fees under the "private attorney general" exception. Because the trial 
court legitimately found that those factors were not satisfied, UBDH's bid for attorney fees 
was legitimately rejected. Again, under the "abuse of discretion" review standard, the trial 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT THREE 
THE "PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL" EXCEPTION SHOULD BE 
OVERRULED BY THIS COURT 
A. Clerk Rawlings' Burden of Persuasion. 
As an alternative ground to affirm the denial of attorney fees in this case, Clerk 
Rawlings asks this Court to revisit, and overrule, its endorsement of the "private attorney 
general" exception to the American rule that litigants pay their own attorney fees. A party 
seeking to overturn this Court's precedent has "a substantial burden of persuasion." State 
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). However, when endorsing the "private attorney 
general" exception in Stewart, this Court did so under the "inherent equitable power" of the 
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state judicial branch. 885 P.2d at 782. It appears distinctly within this Court's discretion to 
contract that power slightly, by removing the "private attorney general" exception from it. 
The ultimate resolution of the Stewart case weakened its precedential value. In 
Stewart, this Court's "private attorney general" holding was an alternative to its holding that 
fees should be paid from a "common fund," if available: 
To the extent the Commission finds, after consideration of the effects of 
today's ruling on the rate proceeding before it, that USWC must disgorge overcharges 
pursuant to an exception to the rule against retroactive rate-making, plaintiffs' award 
of attorney fees should come out of that fund. 
In the alternative, if no such fund is created, we find that the private attorney 
general exception to the American rule is applicable to this case and that USWC 
should be ordered to pay those fees. 
Id. at 783 (emphasis added, citations and footnote omitted).6 
As it happened, upon remand after the Stewart decision, the Public Service 
Commission ordered U.S. West Communications to disgorge its unlawful overcharges, 
thereby creating a "common fund" of several million dollars. See Barker v. Utah v. Public 
Service Comm % 970 P.2d 702, 707-08, 711 (Utah 1998) (the appeal on remand following 
Stewart). Thus the primary, and effective, justification for awarding attorney fees in 
Stewart/Barker turned out to be the "common fund" exception. Barker, 970 P.2d at 708. 
6In its reference to "fund," the Court cited Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 
375 (1970), and Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990), which had been previously 
cited in the Court's description of the "common fund" theory. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782. 
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The alternative, "private attorney general" exception, authorized by this Court in Stewart, 
was effectively rendered moot, or dictum. 
Additionally, it does not appear that the "private attorney general" doctrine has been 
widely utilized in Utah. A Westlaw search yields eleven post-Stewart appellate cases 
wherein this exception was mentioned, and none wherein attorney fees were actually paid 
under this exception.7 Thus Stewart is "not the most weighty of precedents," see Menzies, 
889 P.2d at 399. It does not appear that overruling the "private attorney general" exception, 
at this point, will cause significant disruption to Utah case law, jurisprudence, or legal 
practice. 
B. Practical Problems with "Private Attorney General" Exception. 
This case highlights practical problems with the "private attorney general" exception. 
The complexity and contentiousness of the attorney fee issue far exceeds that in litigation 
of the underlying "re-vote" dispute. That underlying dispute generated 290 pages of record 
material though the trial court's October 15,2002 Ruling, and was resolved two months after 
UBDH filed its complaint. (R. 1-290.) But the attorney fees issue has generated over 500 
7Those cases are UBDH I 2005 UT App. 347, 121 P.3d 39; Save our Canyons v. 
Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 285, 116 P.3d 978; Carrier v. Salt 
Lake County, 2004 UT 98, 104 P.3d 1208; Shipman, 2004 UT 44, 100 P.3d 1151; 
LeVanger v. Highland Estates Property Owners Ass % 2003 UT App 377, 80 P.3d 569; 
Maoris & Assocs. v. Neways, 2002 UT App 406, 60 P.3d 1176; Crank v. Judicial Council, 
2001 UT 8, 20 P.3d 307; Faust v. KAI Technologies, 2000 UT 82, 15 P.3d 1266; Foote v. 
Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998); Barker, 970 P.2d 702; Jensen v. Bowcutt, 892 P.2d 1053 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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pages of additional record material (R. 291-807, 834-45, 852-57), plus an evidentiary 
transcript of 231 pages, plus two appeals.8 Four years have elapsed since UBDH filed its 
complaint, and the attorney fee issue remains unresolved. The tail, it seems, is wagging the 
dog. 
One reason for this lies in the confusing standards for application of the "private 
attorney general" exception. In the trial court, UBDH purported to find thirteen "elements," 
under Stewart, in support of its bid for attorney fees. (R. 658 Exh. 5, Appendix H of this 
brief.) On appeal, UBDH has similarly roamed widely, addressing the three Stewart (or 
Serrano) "private attorney general" factors at various junctures, then indulging in discourses 
related to the "elements" it has apparently derived from those factors, and missing no 
opportunity to criticize Clerk Rawlings and other county officials. UBDH has even implied 
that some sort of emotional element supports the "private attorney general" exception: "It is 
clear from the Stewart opinion that the Court's majority was incensed. . .." "The Stewart 
Court felt so strongly about officials' abdication of responsibility . . .." (R. 298, 304, 
Appellant's Addendum tab 14, emphasis added.) 
The three basic Stewart factors are difficult enough to analyze. The trial court 
expressed its unease about the first factor: whether the prevailing litigant vindicated an 
8No transcript of the hearing on the underlying re-vote dispute is in the record, and 
such transcript would, of course, increase the volume of material amassed in that part of 
the litigation. It is nevertheless evident that the attorney fee issue in this lawsuit has 
consumed far more resources than the underlying "re-vote" issue, which was apparently 
tried on stipulated facts. 
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"important public policy." (R. 908 n.2.) The court cited Serrano, the very case found 
persuasive in Stewart, in which the majority commented: 
It is at once apparent that a consideration of the first factor may in instances present 
difficulties since it is couched in generic terms, contains no specific objective 
standards and nevertheless calls for a subjective evaluation by the judge hearing the 
motion as to whether the litigation before the court has vindicated a public policy 
sufficiently strong or important to warrant an award of attorney fees. 
Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 45, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 569 P.2d at 1314. The dissent in Serrano 
similarly questioned whether the "important public policy" factor was an ungovernable, 
unlimited inquiry. Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 50-54, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 329-32, 569 P.2d at 1317-
20 (dissenting opinions of Richardson and Clark, JJ.). UBDH observes, quite aptly, that the 
term "important public policy" can be read to encompass provisions of the Bill of 
Rights-provisions that are no less important than utility rate setting (the issue in Stewart). 
(Br. of Appellant pp. 26-26, 30.) 
As observed in Point One of this brief, the second "private attorney general" factor 
is also confusing. The formulation "whether the necessary costs" of the underlying lawsuit 
"transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization," 
carries a powerful ring, but lacks clarity. The alternative, "necessity and burden" 
formulation, from Serrano, seems more amenable to objective analysis, yet that formulation 
was not utilized by this Court in Stewart. 
The "exceptional or extraordinary" factor, derived from Stewart footnote 19, is also 
highly subjective. While Stewart purports to provide a benchmark for finding a case 
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"extraordinary," that descriptor remains subject to varying interpretations. The broad 
discretion granted to trial courts in making that determination stands to Clerk Rawlings' 
advantage in this case. However, that same discretion invites trial courts to open the wallets 
of any losing litigant in matters of "public interest," contrary to the American rule and with 
minimal appellate oversight. 
C. The "Private Attorney General" Exception is Unnecessary. 
This Court has, on at least one occasion, rejected a legal doctrine that was shown to 
be unnecessary and impractical. State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1127, 1134-40 (Utah 1994) 
(rejecting "pretext" analysis of constitutional search and seizure law that had been adopted 
by Utah Court of Appeals). As observed earlier, the "private attorney general" exception to 
the American rule has been only infrequently invoked since its 1994 endorsement by this 
Court. This suggests that it is unnecessary. 
The "private attorney general" exception also appears unnecessary because there are 
other, better-established and better-understood exceptions to the American rule. The "bad 
faith" exception, codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2006), makes a losing litigant 
liable for attorney fees, when a claim or defense is "without merit and not brought or asserted 
in good faith . . .." The "common fund" exception rewards litigants who reap monetary 
benefit for their client(s); as such, it is analogous to the well-established contingency fee 
compensation system. The "substantial benefit" exception has its own problem of vagueness 
and subjectivity, but at least facially appears easier to understand and administer. The 
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"breach of trust" exception, a function of the courts' inherent equity powers when Stewart 
was decided, 885 P.2d at 783, has subsequently been codified, at Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
1004 (enacted 2004). 
In fact, the Utah legislature has codified numerous circumstances under which a 
prevailing litigant can be awarded attorney fees. Besides those already mentioned, a tiny 
sampling of such provisions includes Utah Code (2006 ed.) §§ 7-15-1 (bad check 
collection); 13-35-107 (disputes involving powersport vehicle franchises); 16-10a-1331 (suits 
involving appraisal of corporate shares); 32A-lla-110 (suits between beer suppliers); 77-
23a-ll (suits for unlawful interception of communications); 78-11-10 (suits against law 
enforcement officers); 78-45c-312 (enforcement of child custody decrees). The Utah Code 
(unannotated) index heading for "Attorneys' Fees," from which this sampling was culled, 
contains over 100 subheadings. Given the legislature's willingness to provide for attorney 
fee awards where it deems such awards appropriate, it hardly seems necessary for the courts 
to devise additional provisions. 
D. Rejection of "Private Attorney General" Exception by other Courts. 
Thoughtful analyses by other courts have rejected the "private attorney general" 
exception. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. 
Johnson, 111 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 (1999), canvassed history, other jurisdictions, and 
policy considerations before rejecting the "private attorney general" exception. The New 
Mexico court observed that the traditional American rule, that litigants pay their own attorney 
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fees, was a deliberate departure from the English practice of awarding attorney fees to the 
winning litigant-a practice that penalized the loser. 127 N.M. at 658,986 P.2d at 454. Good 
faith prosecutions or defenses, the court noted, should not be penalized or discouraged, as 
happens in the English practice. Id. (citing and quoting authority). 
The New Mexico Court also noted the protracted collateral litigation that ensues when 
attorney fees are awarded to the winning litigant—a feature shared by this case. "Proceedings 
regarding attorney fee awards may continue long after the underlying claim," and thereby 
waste judicial resources. Id. (citing and quoting authority). Following a tradition of invoking 
its inherent powers "sparingly and with circumspection," 127 N.M. at 662, 986 P.2d at 458 
(quoting authority), the New Mexico court expressed concern that "the use of the Court's 
inherent powers to create and apply a private attorney general doctrine is 'without sufficient 
guidelines and too undefined.'" Id. Based on that concern, and quoting the Washington 
Supreme Court's identical observation in Blue Sky Advocates v. State, 107 Wash.2d 112,121, 
727 P.2d 644; 649 (1986) (en banc), the New Mexico court declined to adopt the "private 
attorney general" exception. 
In an observation that is also appropriate in this case, the New Mexico court also 
stated that adoption of the "private attorney general" exception "could easily result in 
decisions that favor a particular class of private litigants while unduly discouraging the 
government from mounting a good faith defense." 127 N.M. at 663,986 P.2d at 459. In this 
case, UBDH has never accused Clerk Rawlings or other Davis County officials of acting in 
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bad faith in their defense of the "re-vote" lawsuit, and has not challenged the trial court's 
finding that they did not act in bad faith. UBDH has never contradicted the trial court's 
observation that its ruling on the underlying re-vote issue could have gone either way. 
Nevertheless, UBDH argues that it is entitled to payment of its attorney fees by Davis 
County. In effect, UBDH is invoking the English rule, the result of which would be to 
punish Clerk Rawlings and Davis County for raising good faith defenses in the underlying 
suit. 
The dissenters in Serrano v. Priest, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 329-332, 20 Cal.3d 50-54, 569 
P.2d at 1317-20, similarly opined that decisions about which "public policies" warrant 
"private attorney general" protection are best made legislatively, not by the judiciary. Those 
dissenters noted that the United States Supreme Court has rejected the "private attorney 
general" exception for federal litigants precisely because it "would be difficult, indeed, for 
the courts, without legislative guidance, to consider some statutes important and others 
unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with the former." Alyeska 
PipelineCo. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,263-64,95 S.Ct. 1612,1626 (1975), quoted 
in Serrano, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 330, 20 Cal.3d at 52, 569 P.2d at 1319 (Richardson, J., 
dissenting). As mentioned earlier, Utah's legislature has actually been quite active in 
codifying situations in which a prevailing litigant may be awarded attorney fees from the 
loser. 
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Invocation of the judicially-created "private attorney general" exception can thrust 
courts into highly-charged political controversies. E.g., Alyeska Pipeline (construction of 
Alaska pipeline); New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL (abortion funding); Blue Sky 
Advocates (power plant siting). This case pulled a trial court into the chronically contentious 
issue of whether public drinking water should contain fluoride. The "prudence" in 
jurisprudence counsels against creating such situations, to preserve the courts' essential 
appearance of impartiality. 
A court's decision to award or deny attorney fees in such cases, under the "private 
attorney general" exception, inevitably raises risks that the court will appear aligned with one 
political side or the other. Such appearance also risks political backlash when fees are 
demanded from a coordinate branch of government. As one dissenter asked in Serrano: "Is 
it any more appropriate for the judiciary to offer a bounty for legislative or executive hide, 
than it is for other branches to seek ours?" 141 Cal. Rptr. at 332, 20 Cal.3d at 54, 569 P.2d 
at 1320 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
In Stewart, this Court did not address the above-described problems with the "private 
attorney general" exception. Instead, the Court appears to have uncritically followed the 
California court majority in Serrano. Now, Clerk Rawlings submits, is an appropriate time 
to thoroughly scrutinize this exception. Based upon the above-listed practical difficulties and 
contrary authorities, this Court should overrule its endorsement of the "private attorney 
general" exception. In accord with the longstanding American rule, and because no statute 
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or contract provides otherwise, UBDH should be obliged to bear its own attorney fees in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Points One and Two of this brief, this Court should hold 
that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it rejected UBDH's motion for 
attorney fees under the "private attorney general" exception. Alternatively, for the reasons 
set forth in Point Three, this Court should overrule its endorsement of that exception to the 
American rule that litigants pay their own attorney fees. In either event, the judgment of the 
trial court, denying UBDH's motion for attorney fees, should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ d a y of October, 2006. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
J. KEVIN MURPHY f 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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BACKGROUND 
This matter is before the Court on "Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and 
Costs" filed November 7, 2002. Defendant's "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Request 
for Attorneys' Fees" was filed November 14, 2002, and "Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs" was filed November 25, 2002. A 
"Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for Oral Argument" was filed by Plaintiffs counsel 
on December 11, 2002, and pursuant to a telephone scheduling conference on January 21, 2003, 
the matter was originally set for oral argument on February 27, 2003. 
After a series of subsequent filings and a number of conferences by the Court with 
counsel, an evidentiary hearing was ultimately held on August 7, 2003, and oral findings and 
conclusions were made by the Court on August 8, 2003. On October 2, 2003, the Court entered 
an order denying Plaintiffs fees request. Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the 
Memorandum decision and order 
VD18875536 
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matter back to this Court for additional findings and the current decision is in response to the 
Court of Appeals' request. This ruling is based on a review of the applicable case law as argued 
by the parties, the evidence presented in the evidentiary hearing held on August 7, 2003, and the 
factual findings contained in the Court's prior ruling entered October 15, 2002, which findings 
are incorporated herein by reference. The Court intends that the findings and conclusions in this 
decision will supplant the oral findings and conclusions made on August 8, 2003, and the 
findings, conclusions and order entered October 2, 2003. The Court further intends that, to the 
extent the current findings conflict with earlier oral or written pronouncements by this Court, this 
decision should control as it relates to the issue of attorney fees. 
ANALYSIS 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 
P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted), that: 
The general rule in Utah, and the traditional American rule, subject to certain 
exceptions, is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a 
statute or contract authorizes such an award.... However, in the absence of a 
statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to 
award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of 
justice and equity. 
The Stewart Court recognized several categories of cases in which courts have exercised their 
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees. This Court will address these 
categories in analyzing whether it is appropriate to exercise this equitable power in the current 
case. 
First, the Stewart Court recognized that the equitable power has been exercised when a 
party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id. (quoting James W. 
Moore et al, Moore's Federal Practice P 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)). In this Court's view, much of the 
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evidence provided by Plaintiff at the August 7, 2003, evidentiary hearing was presented to show 
that Defendant acted in bad faith and that Defendant was biased and prejudiced against those 
who favored fluoridation in the county's drinking water. After reviewing the evidence presented, 
the Court finds that Defendant did not act in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons, as will be explained below. 
The Defendant, at all relevant times, was the elected Davis County Clerk/Auditor and 
served as the chief election officer for Davis County. He conducted the 2000 general election 
and pursuant to resolutions enacted by the Davis County Commission caused a countywide 
proposal concerning whether fluoride should be added to the drinking water of the residents of 
Davis County to be placed on the ballot. In addition to the resolution, he caused a voter 
information pamphlet to be published concerning the pros and cons of implementing fluoridation 
and inserted in the front of the pamphlet information supplied to him by some cities and the 
Weber Basin Water District on estimated costs to fluoridate county water systems. In the general 
election held on November 7, 2000, the voters of Davis County approved the addition of fluoride 
to the public water supplies within the county by a vote of 44.403 in favor to 40,950 opposed. Of 
the 85,353 voters who responded to that ballot question, 52% favored fluoridation and 48% 
opposed fluoridation. As mandated by the requirements of Utah Code Annotated (UCA) Section 
19-4-111(2), on April 5, 2001, the Davis County Health Department issued its order to operators 
of public water systems directing that such operators add fluoride to those systems on or before 
May 1,2002. 
On May 8, 2001, a group of Davis County citizens filed an application, pursuant to UCA 
§ 20A-7-502, with the Defendant to circulate an initiative petition ("Initiative Petition") which 
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they titled "Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act" requesting a "[rjepeal of prior action." 
Specifically, the petition proposed that a re-vote on fluoridation be held, and that county voters 
again be asked the question, "[s]hould fluoride be added to the public water supplies within 
Davis County?" Thereafter, the sponsors began circulating the Initiative Petition to registered 
voters within Davis County. In their Initiative Petition, the sponsors requested that it be 
submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to 
the legal voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election, if the County Commission rejected 
the proposed law or took no action on it. After verifying the requisite number of signatures for a 
local initiative petition pursuant to the local initiative petition statute, UCA § 20A-7-501(2), 
Defendant submitted the Initiative Petition to the Commission on July 9, 2002, for the 
Commission's further action as provided in UCA § 20A-7-501(3). At its next scheduled meeting 
on August 6, 2002, the Commission took no action on the Initiative Petition, and the Defendant, 
upon the advice of legal counsel, stated that he would put the petition question on the general 
election ballot as required by UCA § 20A-7-501(3)(d). The instant lawsuit followed. 
With regard to whether the Defendant acted in bad faith, this Court finds that the 
Defendant sought the legal advice of Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney, Gerald Hess, at all 
stages of the initiative process and performed his duties and responsibilities as the Clerk/Auditor 
in conformance with his good faith understanding of what the law was at the time. Furthermore, 
Defendant followed the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based upon 
counsel's interpretation of the May 8, 2001, petition filed by the Davis County citizen's group in 
conjunction with the Utah Constitution, the initiative statutes (UCA § 20A-7-501 et seq) and 
UCA § 19-4-111. There is no evidence of bad faith, bias or abdication of duties on the part of 
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the Defendant in the events of 2002. The suggestions of bias from the events in 2000-2001 
raised by Plaintiff at the August 2003, evidentiary hearing do not persuade the Court that the 
Defendant abused or exceeded the scope of his authority as a public official. Further, there was 
no evidence that the actions of the Defendant constituted an attempt to subvert the rights of those 
who voted in 2000, as suggested by Plaintiff. 
In the Court's view, this case did not involve bad faith or an abdication of duties by 
government officials. It simply involved government officials following the advice of legal 
counsel, taking a good faith legal position based on their interpretation of the document filed by 
the initiative sponsors and applicable statutes. This case was a case of first impression for both 
the County Clerk and his attorney, as well as the Court as it relates to the appropriate 
interpretation of UCA § 19-4-111 and citizen filings made pursuant to that statute.1 
Second, the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart recognized that "an award of attorney fees is 
common in class action cases when nonparty class members are financially benefitted as a result 
of the efforts of a few litigants who successfully create a fund that benefits the entire class." 885 
P.2d at 782. (citations omitted). This exception, often referred to as the "common fund" theory, 
is typically applied when the activities of a party have resulted in the creation or preservation of a 
fund of money out of which the fees are to be paid. In the present case, of course, there was no 
monetary award and no "fund" was created or maintained by Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court 
cannot use its equitable power to award attorney fees under the "common fund" theory. 
In reference to this second category, the Stewart Court explained in a footnote that 
1
 Since the Court's ruling in October 2002, UCA § 19-4-111 has been clarified by the Legislature to allow a 
new vote on the issue after four years. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(5) (2005). 
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"[ajnother expression of the inherent equitable power of a court to award attorney fees is 
recognized when a plaintiffs litigation confers 'a substantial benefit on the members of an 
ascertainable class.'" Id. at n.18 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S 1,5 (1973) (citations omitted)). 
In explaining this "substantial benefit" exception in footnote 18, the Stewart court quoted from 
the California Supreme Court's decision in Serrano v. Priest. 569 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Cal. 1977). 
The Serrano court opined that the "substantial benefit" exception may be viewed as an offshoot 
of the "common fund" doctrine and "permits the award of fees when the litigant, proceeding in a 
representative capacity, obtains a decision resulting in the conferral of a 'substantial benefit' of a 
pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature." Id. The idea is that the court, in the exercise of its equitable 
discretion, "may decree that under dictates of justice those receiving the benefit should contribute 
to the costs of its production." Id A brief review of this theory as analyzed in the Serrano case 
and its potential application in this case will follow. 
In Serrano, plaintiffs' attorneys (Public Advocates, Inc. and Western Center on Law and 
Poverty) submitted motions for the award of fees against defendants, officials of the State of 
California, under the "common fund," "substantial benefit," and "private attorney general" 
theories after the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court. The Superior Court had ruled that the then-existing California public school 
financing system was in violation of the state's constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1304. 
The plaintiffs in Serrano asserted that as a result of their litigation they conferred benefits 
upon the state defendants, millions of taxpayers, children who were enrolled in and attending 
public school, and the state itself. Id. at n.l 1. The California Supreme Court agreed that findings 
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existed showing that the litigation produced benefits of a conceptual or doctrinal character and 
even proposed that the plaintiffs had "rendered an enormous service to the state and all of its 
citizens" by insuring that the state educational financing system was brought into compliance 
with the state constitution thereby enhancing equal educational opportunities for the children. Id. 
at 1312. Even the bestowal of these enormous benefits, however, did not create a sufficient basis 
for the equitable award of fees under the "substantial benefit" theory. The Court concluded that 
to "award fees under the 'substantial benefit' theory on the basis of considerations of this nature 
- separate and apart from any consideration of actual and concrete benefits bestowed - would be 
to extend that theory beyond its rational underpinnings." Id. 
Applying the "substantial benefit" exception to the current case, the Court concludes that 
there has been no evidence presented by Plaintiff of a substantial pecuniary benefit bestowed by 
this litigation, and the Court further believes that any nonpecuniary benefit created by the 
Plaintiff in this litigation is insufficient to warrant an award of fees. Plaintiff maintains that it 
protected and vindicated the rights of the voters of Davis County by pursuing this action. In this 
Court's view, this service to the citizens is, at best, akin to the service provided by the plaintiffs 
in Serrano, absent of actual and concrete benefits, and therefore undeserving of equitable 
consideration. While Plaintiff asserts that its efforts vindicated the rights of the voters, their 
efforts can just as easily be viewed as supporting and protecting Plaintiffs personal views 
regarding the benefit of fluoridation. This entity was organized specifically to advocate the 
benefits of fluoridation in Davis County and to promote the public acceptance of water 
fluoridation. They most certainly furthered their cause by obtaining a ruling that effectively 
frustrated opponents of fluoridation from obtaining a re-vote on this issue in 2002. Further, an 
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argument can easily be made that only 52% of the voters in Davis County benefitted from the 
Court's interpretation in this action leaving the other 48% disenfranchised in their view. 
Doctrines of fairness and equity do not suggest that all citizens of Davis County, citizens almost 
evenly divided on the merits of a polarizing issue, should have to pay the attorney fees for the 
pro-fluoride advocates. 
The third category recognized in Stewart provides that courts have also used their 
equitable power to grant an award of attorney fees when a beneficiary sues a trustee for violation 
of the trust and obtains recovery for all beneficiaries. 885 P.2d at 783. The case before this 
Court is not of this nature and therefore, the Court cannot use its equitable power to award 
attorney fees from this category. 
The last category recognized by the court in Stewart is the "private attorney general" 
doctrine. Id. The court's award of attorney fees in this category is considered when the 
"'vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary costs 
in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization.'" Id. (quoting Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314). In granting attorney fees under this 
doctrine the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart noted the limited applicability of this category. It 
said, "[W]e note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that any future award of 
attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary case." Id. at n.19. 
In Stewart, petitioner and other telephone users and ratepayers brought suit against the 
Utah Public Service Commission and U.S. West Communications, challenging an order from the 
Commission that among other actions, increased respondent utility's authorized rate of return on 
equity to 12.2%. The issue before the court was whether the Commission could "increase the 
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authorized rate of return on equity above a reasonable rate of return to induce a utility to make 
'discretionary' investments in its plant and equipment in Utah." Id. at 769-70. Specifically, the 
ratepayers challenged (1) the lawfulness of the 12.2% rate of return on equity and (2) the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated § 54-1-4.1 (1990), which authorized the Commission 
to approve the incentive rate regulation plans and allowed a utility to veto such plans. 
In ruling that a 12.2% rate of return on equity was not supported by the evidence, the 
Utah Supreme Court found, among other things, that the Public Service Commission had a 
history of "extraordinary abdication" of its statutory duties for a number of years. Id. at 774. 
Such abdication resulted in U.S. West Communications (USWC) earning "approximately 45% 
more than USWC's authorized rate of return" which amounted "to many tens of millions of 
dollars collected from ratepayers in excess of a fair return." Id. 
The Court also found that Utah Code Annotated § 54-1-4.1(2) was unconstitutional 
because the statute illegally allowed for a delegation of legislative power to a private party. Id. at 
776. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
The Constitution does not confer a power on private parties to veto legislative acts. 
Nevertheless, § 54-4-4.1(2) purports not only to confer a veto power on a utility 
over a quasi-legislative act of the Commission, but it does so without establishing 
any standards governing its exercise... .[T]his Court has held that the Legislature 
cannot constitutionally delegate to private parties governmental power that can be 
used to further private interests contrary to the public interest. 
Id. at 775-76. 
In awarding fees the Supreme Court noted the exceptional nature of the case and focused 
on the substantial monetary benefits conferred on all ratepayers by plaintiffs' actions and the 
windfall obtained by respondent USWC. They found: 
The results achieved by the ratepayers will necessarily benefit all USWC 
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ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to future rates, irrespective of whether 
a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be ordered. Here, USWC has 
collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was authorized by the 
Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order to retain revenues in excess 
of a reasonable rate of return. But for plaintiffs' action, all that would have been 
unchallenged, and none of USWC's ratepayers would ever have had any relief. In 
the absence of a common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to 
require the shareholders of USWC to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney 
fees. See Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314. 
Id. at 783-84. 
Turning to the current case, the first question is whether the plaintiff by this action has 
vindicated a strong or societally important public policy.2 In analyzing this question, the Court 
notes that the principal finding in this litigation was simply that the May 8, 2001, document was 
most appropriately interpreted as a local referendum and not as an initiative petition and was 
therefore untimely. While the Court recognizes that the people's right to directly legislate 
through initiative and referendum is an important and fundamental right, this Court is not 
inclined to conclude that the mere interpretation of a contested petition involves "vindication of a 
strong or societally important public policy." Also, the fact that plaintiff accomplished personal 
interests by pursuing this matter disinclines the Court from finding that this factor has been met. 
Further, even if this criterion for fees had been met, there is no evidence that the 
necessary costs of the litigation "transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an 
extent requiring subsidization." Id. at 783. There was no showing by Plaintiff during the 
evidentiary hearing of the necessity for private enforcement nor of the magnitude of the resultant 
burden on the plaintiff. There was no evidence of Plaintiff s ability to pay attorney fees without 
assistance. There was no showing whatsoever of Plaintiff s financial resources or interests. 
At the outset, an expression of fallibility is appropriate. I am somewhat uncomfortable attempting to 
quantify the relative importance of the public policy involved in this litigation. I concede it may be best for the state 
legislature to determine which public policies are of sufficient importance to wanant an award of attorney fees. See 
Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314-1315. 
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There was no showing that the burden placed on Plaintiff in pursuing this litigation, even if 
necessary, was out of proportion to Plaintiffs individual stake in the matter. The burden to make 
such a factual showing was clearly on the Plaintiff. Without a sufficient factual showing 
regarding these matters, attorney fees cannot be allowed. 
Finally, in this Court's view, the current case is simply not of the exceptional nature or 
magnitude described in Stewart. While the case was unique to this Court because it was the first 
time this Court had been asked to interpret whether a particular document should be 
appropriately categorized as an initiative petition, it is not, in this Court's view, the extraordinary 
type of case envisioned by Stewart. First of all, there were no monetary benefits created by 
plaintiffs actions as in Stewart nor was there a windfall to Defendant. While these factors alone 
may not be controlling, this Court perceives that the significant monetary benefits related to 
future rates bestowed by the plaintiffs actions in Stewart were an important reason for the 
Court's decision regarding attorney fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine. Again, 
there are no such benefits in this case. This Court cannot even find actual or concrete benefits 
created in this case. Also, the magnitude and history of the abdication of duties by the Public 
Service Commission found in Stewart are lacking in this case. As the Court has previously 
found, the Davis County Clerk performed his duties in good faith following the advice of legal 
counsel. This is far different from the Stewart findings of a history of extraordinary abdication by 
the Commission of its statutory duties for a number of years.3 
All of these factors lead the Court to conclude that the "private attorney general" doctrine 
does not apply in this case. 
It should also be noted that a state statute was not found to be unconstitutional in this case, as in Stewart. 
While the Court recognized that Defendant's interpretation led to an inappropriate result as applied to the unique 
Initiative Petition in this case, this is far different from a finding that a state statute is unconstitutional. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes first, the Plaintiff did not present 
sufficient evidence that the Defendant acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons. Second, Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the "common fund" 
theory. In the alternative, Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that as a result of the 
litigation there was a conferral of a "substantial benefit" of either a pecuniary or nonpecuniary 
nature that would warrant an equitable award of fees. Third, this case does not involve a 
beneficiary who sued a trustee for violation of the trust. Finally, Plaintiff rendered insufficient 
evidence to support an award of attorney fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine. 
The Court cannot conceive of any other approach that would allow this Court to use its 
equitable power to grant Plaintiffs attorneys' fees in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees is denied. 
Dated February H , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
•
( A \ ^ c ^ i 4 , ^ ^ 
/
^ ~*<^™*^pAWSON 
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1
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH - : 
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
BETH Q. BECK 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION, : 
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie, : 
Commissioner Carol R. Page, : 
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun; : Civil No.: 020801343 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, : 
Steve S. Rawlings, : 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BETH Q. BECK, Ed.D., being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Bountiful, Utah, and I am currently the Chair of UTAHNS 
FOR BETTER HEALTH-DAVIS, INC. ("UBDHD"), and I have held that position since 
March 1999 when the corporation was formed. I have personal knowledge of the 
matters about which I testify in this Affidavit, to include the corporation's purposes, its 
history, and its members and supporters. 
2. In 1998,1 was a member of the Davis County Board of Health. The Board 
Chair at that time was Dr. David Cope. A Centerville dentist, Dr. Brian Rigby, 
approached the Board with a recommendation that the Board pursue water fluoridation 
as a public health measure in Davis County. The Board thereafter conducted 
discussions of fluoridation at virtually every following Board meeting. Richard Lemon, 
also a Board member, a former Chair of the Board of Health, and the Board's liaison 
with the Utah Association of Local Boards of Health ("UALBH"), carried our Board's 
motion to UALBH that UALBH adopt a formal statement in favor of water fluoridation. 
A position paper to that effect was written by UALBH, which passed unanimously, and 
is still in place as a state-wide position. 
3. In October 1998, Montie Keller, a resident of Lay ton, Utah, became Chair of 
the Davis County Board of Health. In that same Board meeting, Mr. Keller assigned me 
to chair a water-fluoridation sub-committee. Also assigned to that subcommittee were 
three other Board members: Mary Meredith, R.N., Richard Lemon, and Gary Lee, M.D. 
Dr. James Saunders, Executive Director for the Davis County Health Department, and 
his assistant, Ron Toth, worked closely with this sub-committee. Eventually, the 
Interim Director, Richard Harvey, also worked with the sub-committee. 
4. During the several months that the subcommittee met, we explored all 
aspects of water fluoridation, including its effectiveness in preventing tooth decay, its 
safety, its cost, the complexity of water systems in Davis County. We reviewed the 
medical research extant about fluoridation, and the history of implementation 
throughout the U.S., its benefits for the community, the state, and the nation. We 
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learned that water fluoridation had been in place in other communities across the U.S. 
since 1945, and we determined that Utah had the least fluoridation of any state in the 
nation. 
5. We also discovered that fluoridation could only be implemented after a 
public vote, and that the authority of a county commission to place fluoridation on a 
county-wide ballot was restricted to first-class counties. Since Davis County was a 
second-class county, we realized that we needed to seek a change in the state law. 
6. The Board commissioned a Davis County-wide public opinion survey, which 
was conducted by Dan Jones & Associates, and we discovered that the issue attracted a 
great deal of positive interest among county residents. Based on all of the information 
the Board had gathered by early 1999, the Board determined that it should expand the 
effort to promote fluoridation outside of and beyond the Board itself. 
7. In March 1999, members of the Board, acting in their capacities as private 
citizens, and community members held the first meeting of UTAHNS FOR BETTER 
DENTAL HEALTH-DAVIS. We initiated the actions necessary to incorporate as a 
nonprofit corporation, and we began recruiting community members and leaders from 
throughout Davis County who were interested in promoting a county-wide effort to 
bring fluoridation to Davis County. We selected a name similar to an identical citizen 
organization in Salt Lake County which had organized for the same purpose there. I 
was elected Chair, and I have held that position from that date. 
8. UBDHD counted among its members and supporters five of the Davis 
County Board of Health Chairs from 1998 forward, to include Richard Lemon, Dr. 
David Cope, Montie Keller, myself, and Bill Luce. Nearly every member of the Board of 
Health for that same period has been or is a member, to include Dr. Gary D. Lee, Mary 
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Meredith, R.N., Ann Hansen, Floyd Morgan, and Joseph Mott. The organization grew 
to include more than 40 Davis County residents and community leaders (to include 
dentists, physicians, pediatricians, nurses, and other health care professionals) whose 
interest in promoting better dental health through water fluoridation prompted their 
volunteer service to help assure passage of the county-wide vote in 2000. Included are: 
Dr. John Anderson, Dr. Kevin Arbuckle, Doug Bean, Marci Beck, Kathy Behunin, 
Margaret Bennion, Betty Brand, Dee Burningham, Philip Despain, Amy Epps, R.N., 
Carma Fuller, Natalie Gordon, Richard Harvey, MPH, Amy Hughes, David Irvine, 
Nora Jackson, Susan Koehn, Kevin Laurence, Dr. Dale Linton, Dr. Craig Mattinson, Dr. 
Steven Meek, Doug Meredith, Judy Nalui, Scott Paxman, Mike Pfiffer, Dr. Brian Rigby, 
Dr. Jim Saunders, Dr. Chris Simonsen, Margaret Snow, R.N., Sheryl Steuwe, Betsy 
Thurgood, Twila Van Leer, Dr. Robert Winegar, and Debi Woodhaus. All of the 
foregoing persons were and are residents of Davis County. All are and were registered 
voters in Davis County. So far as I am able to determine, all voted in the 2000 election 
in favor of fluoridation. 
9. We also had the active support of more than 35 other individuals from other 
Wasatch Front counties, to include: Nelson Abbot, Susan Aldous, Sen. Ed Allen, Kathy 
Baebler, Bill Barnes, Mike Barnes, Dr. Jim Bekker, Kelli Booth, Dr. Frank Brown, Kevin 
Condra, Louis Cooper, Tim Cosgrove, Dr. Wayne Cottam, Karen Crompton, Lewis 
Garrett, Dr. Arnold Gilbert, Cliff Goff, Julie Hackett, Charlotte Harris, Laura Heald Dee 
Jette, Sen. Paula Julander, Gayle Judd, Dr. Thomas Metcalf, Dr. Joseph Miner, Dr. 
Joseph Newton, Betsy Newton, Dr. Toni Powell, Dr. Kipp Robins, Jodi Robinson, Dr. 
John Starley, Dr. Steven Steed, Ron Toth, Dr. Ariel Thompson, Dr. Tony Tidwell, Dr. 
Mark Valentine, and Julie Valentine, R.N. 
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10. The purposes of UBDHD as set forth in Article 3 of its Articles of 
Incorporation are as follows: 
(1) Promote good dental health and prevent tooth decay through public 
awareness of water fluoridation; (2) seek public participation in obtaining 
approval for community fluoridation; (3) provide accurate and objective 
information about dental health; (4) implement fluoridation of Davis County 
water systems upon approval of the voters. 
11. UBDHD met weekly for many months. We used the American Dental 
Association's model for organizing such an effort. UBDHD became the coordinating 
entity for advocating water fluoridation in Davis County. We met monthly with the 
Salt Lake County UBDH organization and similar groups in Utah, Cache, and Weber 
counties. UBDHD inspected fluoridation facilities at Hill Air Force Base; we sent 
representatives to two national fluoridation conferences. We undertook fundraising 
efforts to finance the activities of the organization. We arranged for meetings with 
experts from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), and that national 
agency sent representatives to meet with us twice. We arranged for Davis County 
Health Department scientists to attend technical training sessions in Tennessee. We 
requested meetings with the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District to determine 
what the critical issues would be for that water provider. Following those meetings, we 
determined that water systems in Davis County were so integrated and mixed that the 
only practical approach to implement fluoridation in Davis County was via a county-
wide vote. 
12. I became Chair of the Davis County Board of Health in October 1999. I held 
that position until December 2000. During that period, UBDHD functioned as the 
principal advocate for fluoridation in Davis County, and my leadership efforts with 
UBDHD were supported by the other members of the Board of Health. We arranged 
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for and coordinated all of the supporting and endorsing activities of every other 
medical and health care professional organization that appeared in behalf of or 
otherwise endorsed fluoridation in Davis County. 
13. In the 2000 session of the Utah Legislature, UBDHD and the other 
organizations working to promote fluoridation, arranged for sponsorship of the 
legislation which authorized commissions in second-class counties to place fluoridation 
on a public ballot in the same manner allowed for first-class counties. UBDHD, along 
with the other county groups, were responsible for all of the lobbying efforts which 
resulted in passage of that legislation. We coordinated witness testimony, we provided 
technical information to legislators, and we rebutted the claims of fluoridation 
opponents, including arguments that there should never be a public vote allowed on 
this issue because "it was too important to be entrusted to the people at large, and a 
public vote was contrary to a republican form of government." Dozens of UBDH 
members and supporters were at the Capitol on a daily basis during that legislative 
session. 
14. For the next five months, UBDHD was the principal entity which worked 
with members of the Davis County Commission to provide information about 
fluoridation that would persuade the Commissioners to enact the resolution required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111 calling for a county-wide vote. UBDHD coordinated a 
citizen-contact program which involved nearly 5,000 contacts with Commissioners from 
county residents. 
15. Following the July 2000 decision by the Commission to place fluoridation on 
the general election ballot, UBDHD and its members coordinated the public education 
campaign throughout Davis County which eventually resulted in the 44,403 ballot 
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victory. I became the director for that entire election effort. I retired from my position 
as assistant principal at Woods Cross High School in September 2000 in order to 
effectively manage that campaign. 
16. Following the 2000 election, UBDHD has continued to be the principal 
public advocate for fluoridation in Davis County. It has been actively involved in each 
subsequent legislative session, responding to efforts by fluoridation opponents to undo 
the results of the 2000 general election. UBDHD has met with city councils throughout 
Davis County to provide educational information about fluoridation. UBDHD 
provided position statements and legal advice to Centerville City officials when some 
Centerville residents sought a re-vote on fluoridation in Centerville in November 2001. 
17. When it became evident that a minority of Davis County residents would 
seek a re-vote on fluoridation in 2002, UBDHD members who voted for fluoridation in 
2000 sought to persuade the County Commission that a re-vote was unlawful and 
would violate the constitutional rights of the 44,403 majority who voted for fluoridation 
in 2000. When it became evident that the Commission would not act to protect the 
interests of UBDHD and the 44,403 majority who voted for fluoridation - and that no 
other entity was likely to represent the interests or rights of the majority — UBDHD 
decided to authorize the filing of the complaint in this action. 
18. No other organization in Davis County has been involved in fluoridation 
education or advocacy more intensively or actively than has UBDHD. No other 
organization is more committed to advocating the rights of the 44,403 majority who 
voted for fluoridation, and UBDHD's members' and supporters' rights as voters in 
Davis County are squarely jeopardized by the actions of the defendants in this 
litigation. 
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DATED this 29th day of August, 2002. 
' &A&/0Q. ^ W o -
Beth Q. Beck, Ed.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, this 29th day of 
August, 2002. 
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Notary Public 
State of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
BETH Q. BECK, Ed.D to be mailed this 29* day of August, 2002, via first-class mail, 
postage pre-paid to: 
Gerald Hess, Esq. 
Assistant Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 








Steve Rawlings [rawlmgs@co.davis ut.usj 
Tuesday. May 01, 2001 8'34 A M 
kd7aaw@yanoo com 
Pat Beckstead, Jerry I less 
initiative Petition 
ear Mr. Hansen, May \, 2001 
our request to file a countywide initiative petition relatea to tat 
luoridation or non fluoridation of Davis County drinking water has been 
.hcrougnly reviewed by my office. Mr. Gerald Hess, County Civil Attorney, 
Las also reviewed your request. We are in concurrence that if all applicable 
'lection law requirements are met related to the filing of tne petition it 
r««y Le receptee ny my office ££ a qualified countywide initiative petition. 
Since, ultimately, the wording for the 2002 ballot will be requested, by rr.y 
office, to come from Mr. Gerald Hess (required under State Election Law;, 
your proposal to meet with Mr. Kess and finalize the wording after tne 
filing or the petition seems like an acceptable request, 
Sinctrc-Ly, 
ve S. Rawlings 
/is Countv Clerk/Auditor 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 20A. ELECTION CODE 
CHAPTER 7. ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 
PART 5. LOCAL INITIATIVES -PROCEDURES 
Copyright © 2002by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
20A-7-501 Initiatives. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person seeking to have an initiative submitted to a local legislative 
body or to a vote of the people for approval or rejection shall obtain legal signatures equal to: 
(i) 10% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes exceeds 25,000; 
(ii) 12 1/2% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election 
at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 25,000 but is more than 10,000; 
(iii) 15% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 10,000 but is more than 2,500; 
(iv) 20% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 2,500 but is more than 500; 
(v) 25% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 500 but is more than 250; and 
(vi) 30% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 250. 
(b) In addition to the signature requirements of Subsection (a), a person seeking to have an initiative submitted 
to a local legislative body or to a vote of the people for approval or rejection in a county, city, or town where the 
local legislative body is elected from council districts shall obtain, from each of a majority of council districts, 
legal signatures equal to the percentages established in Subsection (a). 
(2) If the total number of certified names from each verified signature sheet equals or exceeds the number of 
names required by this section, the clerk or recorder shall deliver the proposed law to the local legislative body at 
its next meeting. 
(3) (a) The local legislative body shall either adopt or reject the proposed law without change or amendment 
within 30 days of receipt of the proposed law. 
(b) The local legislative body may: 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(i) adopt the proposed law and refer it to the people; 
(ii) adopt the proposed law without referring it to the people; or 
(iii) reject the proposed law. 
(c) If the local legislative body adopts the proposed law but does not refer it to the people, it is subject to 
referendum as with other local laws. 
(d) (i) If a county legislative body rejects a proposed county ordinance or amendment, or takes no action on it, 
the county clerk shall submit it to the voters of the county at the next regular general election. 
(ii) If a local legislative body rejects a proposed municipal ordinance or amendment, or takes no action on it, the 
municipal recorder or clerk shall submit it to the voters of the municipality at the next municipal general election. 
(e) (i) If the local legislative body rejects the proposed ordinance or amendment, or takes no action on it, the 
local legislative body may adopt a competing local law. 
(ii) The local legislative body shall prepare and adopt the competing local law within the 30 days allowed for its 
action on the measure proposed by initiative petition. 
(iii) If the local legislative body adopts a competing local law, the clerk or recorder shall submit it to the voters 
of the county or municipality at the same election at which the initiative proposal is submitted. 
(f) If conflicting local laws are submitted to the people at the same election and two or more of the conflicting 
measures are approved by the people, then the measure that receives the greatest number of affirmative votes shall 
control all conflicts. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-403, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 1, § 38; renumbered by L. 1994, ch. 272, § 5. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, renumbered this section, which was enacted 
as § 20A-7-403, and rewrote the section, changing the designations in Subsection (1) and increasing the 
percentages in Subsections (l)(a)(ii) to (v), adding Subsections (l)(a)(i), (l)(b), and (3)(d)(ii), deleting former 
Subsection (3)(g), which read "The local legislative body may call a special election to vote on these measures," 
and making stylistic changes. 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1994, ch. 1, § 75 makes the act effective on January 27, 1994. 




Scope of initiative power. 
Zoning ordinances. 
Constitutionality. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 20A. ELECTION CODE 
CHAPTER 7. ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 
PART 5. LOCAL INITIATIVES -PROCEDURES 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
20A-7-506 Submitting the initiative petition -Certification of signatures by the county clerks -Transfer to local 
clerk. 
(1) No later than 120 days before any regular general election, for county initiatives, or municipal general 
election, for municipal initiatives, the sponsors shall deliver each signed and verified initiative packet to the county 
clerk of the county in which the packet was circulated. 
(2) No later than 90 days before any general election, the county clerk shall: 
(a) check the names of all persons completing the verification on the back of each signature sheet to determine 
whether or not those persons are residents of Utah and are at least 18 years old; and 
(b) submit the name of each of those persons who is not a Utah resident or who is not at least 18 years old to the 
attorney general and county attorney. 
(3) No later than 60 days before any general election, the county clerk shall: 
(a) check all the names of the signers against the official registers to determine whether or not the signer is a 
voter; 
(b) certify on the petition whether or not each name is that of a voter; and 
(c) deliver all of the packets to the local clerk. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-506, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 272, § 10; 1995, ch. 165, § 10; 1999, ch. 45, § 20; 2000, ch. 
3, § 14. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. -The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection (2) and redesignated 
former Subsection (2) as Subsection (3). 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 15, 1999, substituted references to residents of Utah for "registered to vote 
in Utah" twice in Subsection (2). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added "and are at least 18 years old" in Subsection (2)(a) and in 
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Subsection (2)(b) changed the submission requirement from "a Utah resident" to "not a Utah resident" and added 
"or who is not at least 18 years old." 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1994, ch. 272 became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953§20A-7-506 
UT ST § 20A-7-506 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 20A. ELECTION CODE 
CHAPTER 7. ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 
PART 5. LOCAL INITIATIVES -PROCEDURES 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
20A-7-507 Evaluation by the local clerk. 
(1) When each initiative packet is received from a county clerk, the local clerk shall check off from his record the 
number of each initiative packet filed. 
(2) (a) After all of the initiative packets have been received by the local clerk, the local clerk shall count the 
number of the names certified by the county clerk that appear on each verified signature sheet. 
(b) If the total number of certified names from each verified signature sheet equals or exceeds the number of 
names required by Section 20A-7-501, the local clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word 
"sufficient." 
(c) If the total number of certified names from each verified signature sheet does not equal or exceed the number 
of names required by Section 20A-7-501, the local clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word 
"insufficient." 
(d) The local clerk shall immediately notify any one of the sponsors of his finding. 
(3) If the local clerk finds the total number of certified signatures from each verified signature sheet to be 
msutticient, any sponsor may tile a written demand with the local clerk for a recount of the signatures appearing on 
the initiative petition in the presence of any sponsor. 
(4) (a) Once a petition is declared insufficient, the sponsors may not submit additional signatures to qualify the 
petition for the pending election. 
(b) If the petition is declared insufficient, the petition sponsors may submit additional signatures to qualify the 
petition for: 
(i) the next regular general election following the pending regular general election if the petition was a county 
initiative petition; or 
(ii) the next municipal general election if the petition was a municipal initiative petition. 
(5) (a) If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any initiative petition, any voter may apply to the supreme court 
for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so within ten days after the refusal. 
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(b) If the supreme court determines that the initiative petition is legally sufficient, the local clerk shall file it, 
with a verified copy of the judgment attached to it, as of the date on which it was originally offered for filing in his 
office. 
(c) If the supreme court determines that any petition filed is not legally sufficient, the supreme court may enjoin 
the local clerk and all other officers from certifying or printing the ballot title and numbers of that measure on the 
official ballot for the next election. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-507, enacted by L. 1994. ch. 272, § 11; 1995, ch. 165, §11; 2002, ch. 133, § 5. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. -The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted former Subsection (4), relating to the 
right of sponsors to demand additional signature sheets if the petition is found to be insufficient, and redesignated 
former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4). 
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, added Subsection (4) and renumbered sections accordingly. 
Effective Dates. -Laws 1994, ch. 272 became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 20A-7-507 
UT ST § 20A-7-507 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Wfestlaw 
UT ST § 20A-7-601 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 20A-7-601 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 20A. ELECTION CODE 
CHAPTER 7. ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 
PART 6. LOCAL REFERENDA -PROCEDURES 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
20A-7-601 Referenda -General signature requirements -Signature requirements for land use laws -Time 
requirements. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a person seeking to have a law passed by the local legislative body 
submitted to a vote of the people shall obtain legal signatures equal to: 
(a) 10% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes exceeds 25,000; 
(b) 12 1/2% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 25,000 but is more than 10,000; 
(c) 15% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 10,000 but is more than 2,500; 
(d) 20% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 2,500 but is more than 500; 
(e) 25% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 500 but is more than 250; and 
(f) 30% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last election at 
which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 250. 
(2) (a) As used in this Subsection (2), "land use law" includes a land use development code, an annexation 
ordinance, and comprehensive zoning ordinances. 
(b) A person seeking to have a land use law passed by the local legislative body submitted to a vote of the 
people shall obtain legal signatures equal to: 
(i) in counties and first and second class cities, 20% of all votes cast in the county or city for all candidates for 
governor at the last election at which a governor was elected; and 
(ii) in third class cities and towns, 35% of all the votes cast in the city or town for all candidates for governor at 
the last election at which a governor was elected. 
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(3) (a) Sponsors of any referendum petition challenging, under Subsection (1) or (2), any local law passed by a 
local legislative body shall file the petition within 35 days after the passage of the local law. 
(b) The local law remains in effect until repealed by the voters via referendum. 
(4) If the referendum passes, the local law that was challenged by the referendum is repealed as of the date of the 
election. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-404, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 1, § 39; renumbered by L. 1994, ch. 272, § 17; 1999, ch. 
45, §21. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. -The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, renumbered this section, which was enacted 
as § 20A-7-404; in Subsection (1), added Subsection (a) and redesignated the other subsections accordingly, 
substituted "does not exceed 25,000 but is more than" for "exceeds" in Subsection (b), increased the percentages in 
Subsections (b) to (e), which had been 10% in Subsection (b), 12 1/2% in Subsection (c), 15% in Subsection (d), 
and 20% in Subsection (e); in Subsection (2), inserted the Subsection (a) designation, substituted "35 days" for 
"30 days," and added Subsection (b); deleted former Subsection (3) relating to referendum petitions challenging 
adopted local laws; added Subsection (3); and deleted former Subsection (4) relating to the failure of referenda 
challenging local laws. 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 15, 1999, added "Except as provided in Subsection (2)" at the beginning 
of the introductory paragraph of Subsection (1); added Subsection (2), redesignating existing Subsections (2) and 
(3) as (3) and (4), and inserted "under Subsection (1) or (2)" in Subsection (3)(a). 
Effective Dates. -Laws 1994, ch. 1, § 75 makes the act effective on January 27, 1994. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Referendum petition. 
The words "referendum petition" in Subsection (2)(a) is not a synonym for "referendum application," and 
sponsors of a referendum petition challenging an ordinance were required to file the petition with the local clerk 
within 35 days after passage ol the ordinance. Tobias v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 373 (Utah 1998). 
For purposes of time requirements, a referendum petition is "filed" with the local clerk when it is deposited with 
such clerk, not after the county clerk certifies the names and then delivers the petition back to the local clerk. 
Tobias v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 373 (Utah 1998). 
U.C.A. 1953§20A-7-601 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 20A. ELECTION CODE 
CHAPTER 7. ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 
PART 6. LOCAL REFERENDA -PROCEDURES 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
20A-7-606 Submitting the referendum petition -Certification of signatures by the county clerks -Transfer to local 
clerk. 
(1) No later than 120 days before any regular general election for county referenda, or municipal general election 
for local referenda, the sponsors shall deliver each signed and verified referendum packet to the county clerk of the 
county in which the packet was circulated. 
(2) No later than 90 days before any general election, the county clerk shall: 
(a) check the names of all persons completing the verification on the back of each signature sheet to determine 
whether or not those persons are Utah residents and are at least 18 years old; and 
(b) submit the name of each of those persons who is not a Utah resident or who is not at least 18 years old to the 
attorney general and county attorney. 
(3) No later than 60 days before any general election, the county clerk shall: 
(a) check all the names of the signers against the official registers to determine whether or not the signer is a 
voter; 
(b) certify on the referendum petition whether or not each name is that of a voter; and 
(c) deliver all of the referendum packets to the local clerk. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-606, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 272, § 22; 1995, ch. 165, § 14; 1999, ch. 45, § 24; 2000, ch. 
3, §18. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. -The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection (2) and redesignated 
former Subsection (2) as Subsection (3). 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 15, 1999, substituted "Utah resident" for "registered to vote in Utah" twice 
in Subsection (2). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added the age requirement "at least 18 years old" throughout 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Subsection (2). 
Effective Dates. -Laws 1994, ch. 272 became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 20A-7-606 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 20A. ELECTION CODE 
CHAPTER 7. ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 
PART 6. LOCAL REFERENDA -PROCEDURES 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
20A-7-607 Evaluation by the local clerk. 
(1) When each referendum packet is received from a county clerk, the local clerk shall check off from his record 
the number of each referendum packet filed. 
(2) (a) After all of the referendum packets have been received by the local clerk, the local clerk shall count the 
number of the names certified by the county clerks that appear on each verified signature sheet. 
(b) If the total number of certified names from each verified signature sheet equals or exceeds the number of 
names required by Section 20A-7-601, the local clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word "sufficient." 
(c) If the total number of certified names from each verified signature sheet does not equal or exceed the number 
of names required by Section 20A-7-601, the local clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word 
"insufficient." 
(d) The local clerk shall immediately notify any one of the sponsors of his finding. 
(3) If the local clerk finds the total number of certified signatures from each verified signature sheet to be 
insufficient, any sponsor may file a written demand with the local clerk for a recount of the signatures appearing on 
the referendum petition in the presence of any sponsor. 
(4) (a) If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any referendum petition, any voter may apply to the Supreme 
Court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so within ten days after the refusal. 
(b) If the Supreme Court determines that the referendum petition is legally sufficient, the local clerk shall file it, 
with a verified copy of the judgment attached to it, as of the date on which it was originally offered for filing in his 
office. 
(c) If the Supreme Court determines that any petition filed is not legally sufficient, the Supreme Court may 
enjoin the local clerk and all other officers from certifying or printing the ballot title and numbers of that measure 
on the official ballot for the next election. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-607, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 272, § 23; 1995, ch. 165, § 15. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
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Amendment Notes. -The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted former Subsection (4), relating to the 
right of sponsors to demand additional signature sheets if the petition is found to be insufficient, and redesignated 
former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4). 
Effective Dates. -Laws 1994, ch. 272 became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 20A-7-607 
UT ST § 20A-7-607 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH -
DAVIS, INC , a Utah Nonprofit Corporation, DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
Plaintiff MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
vs 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION, 
Commissioner Dan R McConkie, Civil No 020801343 
Commissioner Carol R Page, 
Commissioner Michael J Cragun; 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, ~ Judge Glen R Dawson 
Steve S Rawlings, 
Defendants 
Defendants respectfully submit this Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
Rule 65A(e) states the following 
Grounds A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only 
upon a showing by the applicant that 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues, 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever 
damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or 
enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the 
public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail 
on the merits of the underlying claim or the case presents serious issues on 
the merits which should be the subject of further litigation 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, NOT PLAINTIFF, WILL 
SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM IF THE INJUNCTION IS 
ISSUED. 
Defendant Steve S. Rawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor, received from 
a group of petitioners an initiative petition (Plaintiffs Complaint Exhibit 2). The 
petitions were submitted pursuant to the local initiative procedures found in 20A-7-501 et 
seq. Utah Code Ann. Section 20A-7-501(d)(1) states in part the following: 
The County Clerk shall submit it to the voters of the county at the 
next regular general election." 
Therefore, Defendant Steve S. Rawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor, has a statutory 
obligation to place the subject matter of the petition before the voters of the county at the 
next regular general election on November 5, 2002. 
In order to meet deadlines of getting the ballot printed, the ballot must be 
submitted to the printer at least by Tuesday, September 10, 2002. 
In addition, Section 20A-7-402 Utah Code Ann. requires the County Clerk 
to prepare a local voter information pamphlet and to mail it to all registered voters at least 
eight days before the election of November 5, 2002. Granting a preliminary injunction 
would significantly interfere with the election process by preventing the measure from 
being placed on the ballot and interfere with the duties of the County Clerk established by 
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the State Legislature Not only would the judiciary be meddling in the legislative 
branch's domain, but the Clerk would be precluded from placing the initiative on the 
ballot as required by law 
Plaintiff on the other hand will suffer no irreparable harm if the 
injunction is not issued There is absolutely no evidence that Plaintiffs efforts were 
instrumental in the successful passage of the vote in the election of 2000 Nor is there 
any showing that Plaintiff represents citizens of Davis County as their voice in 2002 
Indeed the truest expression of what the wants of the people in 2002 may be would be for 
the ballot initiative to be presented to them for their vote on November 5, 2002 
Moreover, it is mere speculation at this point whether the ballot initiative 
will pass or fail on election day, November 5, 2002 It is possible and highly likely that 
the alleged efforts of Plaintiff and those who voted for the ballot initiative in 2000 may be 
vindicated and this entire issue rendered moot There is a complete lack of evidence 
supporting Plaintiffs claim that it will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is 
issued 
POINT II. 
THE ALLEGED THREATENED INJURY TO PLAINTIFF DOES 
NOT OUTWEIGH THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE WHICH 
DEFENDANT DAVIS COUNTY CLERK WOULD SUFFER AS A 
RESULT OF BEING RESTRAINED. 
In addition to the argument set forth in Point I , it should be noted that 
Plaintiff is a non-profit corporation and therefore has no right to vote There is no 
showing nor none can be made to demonstrate that Plaintiffs efforts in the 2000 election 
caused the ballot measure to pass Moreover, Plaintiffs concerns are speculative at best, 
3 
given the distinct possibility that the election results of November, 2002, will be the same 
as those of November, 2000. 
POINT III. 
THE INJUNCTION, IF ISSUED, WOULD BE ADVERSE TO THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST. 
Article VI of the Constitution of Utah is a reminder of the fundamental 
principle that the legislative power is vested in the legal voters of any county, city or 
town Article VI contains the fundamental power of the people to "initiate any desired 
legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county. . . ." The issuance of 
an injunction would not only fly in the face of the express language of the Constitution, 
but would have a chilling effect on the rights of the citizens to initiate direct legislation. 
If Plaintiffs position is adopted and the initiative petition is blocked from the ballot, then 
at least 9,600 or more citizens of Davis County have had their voices silenced and the 
measure adopted in 2000 becomes a law that is irrevocable Such a position ridicules the 
power for direct legislation that is vested in the people and is manifestly contrary to the 
Constitution and clearly adverse to the public interest. 
POINT IV. 
THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WILL NOT PREVAIL ON THE MERITS OF THE 
UNDERLYING CLAIM AND THEREFORE THE MOTION FOR 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Plaintiff asserts that the uself-styled initiative petition11 is nothing more 
than a referendum. Defendants concede that if the initiative petition were a referendum 
the petitioners have not complied with the law that governs referendum measures. 
4 
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However, the fatal flaw in Plaintiffs position is clearly manifest in the definition of 
referendum. Section 20A-7-102(12) defines referendum as: 
"Referendum means a law passed by the legislature or by a local 
legislative body that is being submitted to the voters for their approval or 
rejection." 
It is without question that there is no law passed by the legislature that is 
contained in petitioners' initiative or being challenged by petitioners' initiative. Likewise 
and of equal importance, there is no law passed by a local legislative body (Davis County 
Commission) that is being submitted to the voters for their approval or rejections. What 
is being proposed is exactly what the definition of an initiative is as set forth in 
subparagraph 3 of Section 20A-7-102. 
"Initiative means a new law proposed for adoption by the public as 
provided in this chapter " 
The new law would amend the old law by precluding the introduction of fluoride into the 
water supplies of Davis County. 
A fundamental flaw in Plaintiffs position is in the insistence that the 
voters in the 2000 general election passed a law The ballot initiative in the general 
election of 2000 was placed there because the law passed by the State Legislature 
authorized the County Commission to place the matter on the ballot as an "opinion 
question." The law (19-4-111 Utah Code Ann.) adopted by the State Legislature then 
provides that if the voters vote in favor of the opinion question, the Health Department, 
as an administrative function, "shall require the addition of fluorine to all public water 
supplies within that county. . . . " 
There is simply no law passed by the legislature or a local legislative body 
that is being submitted to the voters through the initiative of petitioners which is the 
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subject of this litigation. Therefore Plaintiffs cannot prevail on the merits of the 
underlying claim. 
As noted in this argument, the petition of petitioners is an initiative as 
defined by law, meaning ua new law proposed for adoption by the public as provided in 
this chapter" The Supreme Court of Utah in Shriver vs. Bench, 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 
1957), referenced with tacit approval the following: 
In a democratic society the fundamental power of government is in the 
people, and the policy of the law generally is to regard it as being reserved 
to them except as it may have been clearly declared otherwise. Following 
this principle courts historically have been reluctant to say that particular 
measures are not subjects for legislation where any legislative process set 
up by law has been followed. And some court have inclined toward 
giving the initiative and referendum provisions what they term a "liberal" 
construction based on the reasoning that this recognizes that the political 
power reposes in the people rather than to apply the law as to minimize 
their power, (at page 477) 
In addition to the foregoing, the Court stated in Palmer vs. Broadbent, 260 
P.2d 581 (Utah 1953), 
"The State Constitution vests in the people the right to legislate directly. 
The legislature has supplemented this provision by this statute and it is the 
duty of the courts to construe the statutes so as to make it operative where 
possible We have held that the formal requirements of this statute are 
directory and not mandatory and that substantial compliance with such 
provisions is sufficient " (at page 584) 
The foregoing is indicative of the liberal nature of allowing substantial compliance so 
that the right of the people to directly legislate is not hindered but enhanced. 
The plain language of the Constitution in Article VI (2) gives the "legal 
voters of any county . . ." the power to "initiate any desired legislation and cause it to 
be submitted to the people of the county." To prohibit the people the right to vote on 
the initiative petition would be in direct conflict with the plain language of the 
6 
Constitution of this state Granting the injunction would eliminate the rights of the 
people to initiate direct legislation as protected by the Constitution and would establish 
a law that could never be challenged by the direct vote of the citizens of Davis County 
Such a position is not only contrary to the Constitution of Utah but inconsistent with the 
intent of the legislature to allow the voters in Davis County to determine for themselves 
whether their water would be fluoridated We urge this Court to deny the injunctive 
relief sought by Plaintiff, dismiss this lawsuit and allow the voice of the people to be 
heard 
Dated this
 iyL 3 day of August, 2002 
*,&< 
GERALD E HESS 
Chief Civil Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction to 
David R Irvine and Janet I Jenson 
Attorneys at Law 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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AUGUST 8, 2003 
THE COURT: WE'RE ON THE PHONE AND ON THE RECORD IN 
THE MATTER OF UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH VERSUS 
RAWLINGS. 020801343. SET TODAY FOR DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES. COUNSEL, LET ME FIRST OF ALL SAY 
I KNOW PROCEDURALLY WE STRUGGLED WITH HOW TO GET THIS BEFORE 
THE COURT, AND I ULTIMATELY FEEL THE APPROACH WE USED WITH 
THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS MOST MEANINGFUL TO THE COURT. AS 
YOU KNOW, I HAD STRUGGLED WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN PARTS 
OF AFFIDAVITS, AND I THINK BEING ABLE TO HAVE AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING WHERE WE WERE RULE REAL TIME ON EVIDENTIARY MATTERS 
JUST WENT SO MUCH BETTER. AND I APPRECIATE THE GOOD WORK 
THAT COUNSEL WENT INTO IN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATIONS 
YESTERDAY. 
SO HAVING SAID THAT I'VE TAKEN SOME TIME TO GO BACK 
THROUGH THE EVIDENCE THAT YOU'VE PRESENTED AND THE ARGUMENTS 
THAT YOU MADE YESTERDAY. I'M PREPARED TO RULE ON THE MATTER. 
I HAVE READ AND REREAD THE STEWART CASE — AND OH, I 
GUESS LET ME MENTION, MR. IRVINE, I DID RECEIVE THE TWO CASES 
THAT YOU FAXED TO ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. DID YOU GET THOSE, 
MR. WILSON? 
MR. WILSON: I DID. 
THE COURT: AND I DID HAVE THE TIME TO READ THOSE 
ALSO. LET ME JUST PUT MY FINGER ON IT HERE JUST A MINUTE. 
BEAR WITH ME JUST A MINUTE. I READ THEM THIS MORNING AND 
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THEN I PUT THEM BACK IN THE FILE. BUT I DID HAVE A CHANCE TO 
READ EACH OF THOSE INCLUDING THE SERRANO CASE WHICH IS THE 
CALIFORNIA CASE THAT OUR SUPREME COURT HAD REFERRED TO IN THE 
STEWART DECISION. 
SO NOW THEN HAVING READ THOSE, HAVING AGAIN READ STEWART 
MANY TIMES AND I BELIEVE I AM PREPARED TO — TO MAKE MY 
DECISION. 
FIRST MY BEST VIEW OF THIS AS I LISTENED TO THE TESTIMONY 
YESTERDAY IS THAT, IN FACT, THIS CASE IS NOT LIKE THE STEWART 
DECISION. IN MY VIEW, THIS CASE DID NOT INVOLVE AN ABDICATION 
OF DUTIES BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT SIMPLY INVOLVED 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOLLOWING THE ADVICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
TAKING A LEGAL POSITION BASED ON THEIR INTERPRETATION BOTH OF 
THE STATUTE AND OF THE DOCUMENT FILED BY THE INITIATIVE 
SPONSORS OR THE REFERENDUM SPONSORS, HOWEVER YOU WANT TO COUCH 
THAT. BUT AN INTERPRETATION BY THEM OF THAT DOCUMENT AND THEN 
THE APPLICATION OF STATUTES AS IT RELATES TO SECTION 19-4 OF 
OUR UTAH CODE. 
IT'S TRUE — AND THE OTHER THING I DID LAST NIGHT, I WENT 
BACK AND READ THE RULING THAT THE COURT HAD ISSUED AND THAT 
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER HAD HELPED ME WITH. IT'S TRUE THAT 
I HAVE DETERMINED THE PETITION WAS LEGALLY INVALID. THAT IT 
WAS AN, IN THE COURT'S VIEW, INTERPRETED AS AN UNTIMELY 
REFERENDUM OR EVEN — AND I THINK -- WELL, AND I ALSO DID DO 
AN ANALYSIS OF EVEN IF IT HAD BEEN VIEWED AS A PETITION, AND 
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I'LL GET INTO THAT A LITTLE BIT IN MY DISCUSSION HERE. BUT 
IT'S TRUE THAT I DID DETERMINE THAT. I WILL ADMIT AS A HUMAN 
THAT PEOPLE IN GOOD FAITH COULD DISAGREE ABOUT THAT DECISION. 
OUR APPELLATE COURT MAY ULTIMATELY TELL ME THAT I'VE MADE A 
MISTAKE ON THAT. I'M NOT SO CONFIDENT IN THAT DECISION THAT I 
DON'T ALLOW THAT I COULD BE OVERRULED. 
IN THAT DECISION THAT I MADE, THERE WAS AN ISSUE AS TO 
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCUMENT. THAT DOCUMENT WAS 
ENTITLED REVOTE ON MANDATORY FLUORIDE ACT. I FOUND, AND I 
THINK APPROPRIATELY SO, BUT I FOUND THE PETITION SOUGHT TO DO 
WHAT A REFERENDUM IS RESERVED FOR, WAS THEREFORE UNTIMELY. 
THAT WAS MY INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCUMENT. AGAIN, I ADMIT 
THAT I COULD BE WRONG ON THAT. 
SECOND, I ANALYZED THE DOCUMENT, EVEN VIEWED IT AS A 
PETITION, AND IN THIS ANALYSIS I WAS REQUIRED TO ANALYZE THE 
PETITION REFERENDUM STATUTES AND ALSO HOW THEY RELATED WITH 
SECTION 19-4-111. 
FOR ME AS I REVIEWED THE UTAH LAW, THIS WAS A CASE OF 
FIRST IMPRESSION. IT WAS NOT AN EASY DECISION TO COME TO. I 
BELIEVE REASONABLE MINDS COULD HAVE VIEWED THE MATTER 
OTHERWISE. AT THIS POINT IT APPEARS THE LEGISLATURE HAS 
CLARIFIED 19-4-111. SO THERE MAY NOT BE A NEED TO TEST MY 
INTERPRETATION IN THAT REGARD. BUT I DO WANT THE RECORD TO BE 
CLEAR THAT WHILE I'M COMFORTABLE WITH MY DECISION, THAT I 
RECOGNIZE THAT IN GOOD FAITH REASONABLE PEOPLE COULD DIFFER 
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BOTH AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCUMENT TITLED REVOTE 
ON -- REVOTE ON THE FLUORIDATION ACT, AND WITH REGARD TO MY 
INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERPLAY OF THE PETITION STATUTE 
2-19-4-111. 
I FURTHER FIND THAT — VIEW — THAT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT 
THE ACTIONS OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT THE 
RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO VOTED IN 2000. I SIMPLY DON'T FIND 
ANYTHING INHERENTLY BAD OR ANY BAD FAITH IN THE PROCESS THAT 
TOOK PLACE. IN MAKING THAT FINDING, I ACCEPT MR. RAWLINGS' 
TESTIMONY WITH REGARD TO HIM PERFORMING HIS DUTIES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES AS HE THOUGHT WAS APPROPRIATE. IT'S MY VIEW 
THAT THE CLERK AUDITOR AND THE COMMISSIONER WERE ACTING ON THE 
ADVICE OF MR. GERALD HESS IN CONFORMANCE WITH HIS GOOD FAITH 
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE LAW WAS AT THE TIME. 
I'M FURTHER PERSUADED BY THE FACT THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST 
TIME MR. RAWLINGS HAD DEALT WITH AN INITIATIVE PETITION SINCE 
HE STARTED HIS JOB IN 1999. I DON'T DENY THAT MR. RAWLINGS 
HAD SOME VIEWS ABOUT THE ISSUE OF FLUORIDATION. I ACCEPT THAT 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AS HUMAN BEINGS HAVE VIEWS. BUT MY BEST VIEW 
IS THAT HE ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN GOOD FAITH BASED ON THE 
ADVICE OF MR. HESS AND MR. HESS'S BEST VIEW OF THE SAW IN 
PROCESSING THIS MATTER IN 2002. 
I MUST SAY I CAN'T FIND BIAS, PREJUDICE OR AN ABDICATION 
OF HIS DUTIES IN THE EVENTS OF 2002, AND I FIND THAT THE 
SUGGESTIONS OF HIM BEING BIASED FROM EVENTS IN 200-2001 ARE 
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SIMPLY UNPERSUASIVE TO ME AS THEY RELATE TO 2002. 
IN TURNING TO THE STEWART DECISION, THE SUPREME COURT 
RECOGNIZED THAT — WELL, LET ME SAY HERE THAT EVEN FINDING 
THESE THINGS, MR. IRVINE ARGUED, AND I THINK AN ARGUMENT THAT 
WAS AN INTERESTING ARGUMENT TO THE COURT, THAT EVEN GIVEN 
THIS, THIS IS SUCH AN EXTRAORDINARY CASE THAT BASED ON THE 
VINDICATION OF PUBLIC'S RIGHTS THE COURT SHOULD STILL CONSIDER 
WHETHER ATTORNEYS FEES ARE APPROPRIATE, EVEN IF THERE ISN'T 
BAD FAITH SHOWN. AND OF COURSE THE ARGUMENT THERE IS THE 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN STEWART DIDN'T ACT IN BAD FAITH. 
AND SO I DID ANALYZE STEWART IN LIGHT OF THIS FACTUAL 
SETTING. AND THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN TYPES OF 
CASES WHERE ATTORNEYS FEES COULD BE ALLOWED, CERTAINLY ONE OF 
THE AREAS WERE CASES WHERE THE LITIGATION HAS BEEN IN BAD 
FAITH, VEXATIOUS AND IN MY VIEW BASED ON THESE FINDINGS THIS 
CASE DOESN'T FALL INTO THAT CATEGORY. THEY ALSO ALLOW THAT 
ATTORNEYS FEES COULD BE GIVEN IN A CASE WHERE THERE WAS A FUND 
CREATED. THIS CASE DOESN'T FIT INTO THAT CATEGORY. 
THE THIRD CATEGORY THOUGH IS THE ONE THAT MR. IRVINE AND 
I SHOULD SAY THE PLAINTIFFS PUT FORWARD FOR THE COURT; THAT 
IS, WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT PUBLIC RIGHTS THAT HAVE 
BEEN VINDICATED. I AM OF COURSE AFFECTED SOMEWHAT BY THE FACT 
THAT IN THE STEWART CASE, THE SUPREME COURT RELIED ON THAT 
CATEGORY, THE CATEGORY DEALING WITH VINDICATION OF IMPORTANT 
PUBLIC RIGHTS. BUT STILL FOUND IT IMPORTANT THAT IN THAT 
7 
EXTRAORDINARY CASE THERE WAS ALSO A PUBLIC BENEFIT, MONETARY 
BENEFIT, THAT WAS GIVEN. AND THAT DOES AFFECT MY THOUGHT 
PROCESS. 
IT'S A LITTLE INTERESTING IN THIS CASE AND I STRUGGLED 
SOME BECAUSE I GUESS AS I WAS VINDICATING THE PUBLIC RIGHTS OF 
THE 2000 VOTERS IN THE MINDS OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE MINDS 
OF THE DEFENDANTS, I WAS ABUSING THEIR RIGHT TO VOTE ANEW, A 
RIGHT THAT I FOUND DIDN'T EXIST. SO THE CONCEPT OF 
VINDICATING ONE'S RIGHT TO VOTE I GUESS COULD BE VIEWED BOTH 
WAYS IN THIS CASE. AND I WAS A CHAMPION WITH ONE AND THE 
DEMON WITH REGARD TO THE OTHER. AND WHILE I FIND THAT VOTING 
RIGHTS ARE SIGNIFICANT, I CAN'T FIND IN THIS CASE THAT IT'S 
THE TYPE OF CASE ENVISIONED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THEIR 
STEWART DECISION. 
BUT FOOTNOTE 19 IN THE STEWART DECISION GAVE GUIDANCE 
THAT ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD ONLY BE GRANTED IN EXTRAORDINARY 
CASES. IN MY VIEW, ALTHOUGH THIS IS A UNIQUE CASE, IT'S NOT 
AN EXTRAORDINARY CASE. IT'S LESS OF AN ABDICATION OF 
GOVERNMENT DUTIES. IT'S MORE OF DETERMINATION OF A STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION OF -- STATUTORY INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT 
THAT THE PEOPLE SIMPLY DISAGREED ON IN GOOD FAITH. AND IT 
SEEMS AGAIN AN INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCUMENT. 
THEREFORE IT'S MY BEST VIEW THAT THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL EXCEPTION OR THE STEWART EXCEPTION TO THE AMERICAN 
RULE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. I SIMPLY FIND THAT WHILE 
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THE CASE IS UNIQUE, IT IS NOT ON THE SAME FOOTING WITH THE 
STEWART CASE AND DOESN'T GIVE RISE TO AN ALLOWANCE OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
I WILL ASK COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT TO PREPARE A FORM OF 
ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S DECISION. I'LL ASK THAT 
THAT BE — ACTUALLY I THINK YOU SHOULD HAVE FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS, MR. WILSON, CONSISTENT WITH THE FINDINGS THAT 
I JUST MADE BASED ON THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. I ASK THAT YOU 
PROVIDE THAT TO MR. IRVINE AND MISS JENSEN FOR APPROVAL AS TO 
FORM BEFORE IT'S SUBMITTED TO THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE. AND I 
WILL SIGN OFF IT IF IT APPROVED AS TO FORM. OTHERWISE, I'LL 
WAIT THE FIVE DAYS AND IF WE NEED TO HAVE FURTHER HEARING TO 
CLARIFY MY FINDINGS, WE CAN DO THAT. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN 
ASSIGNED TO PREPARE, MR. WILSON. 
MR. WILSON: I DON'T THINK I HAVE ANY QUESTIONS 
RELATIVE TO THAT. I DO HAVE A QUESTION. WE HAVE THE RULING, 
THE EARLIER RULING, OF THE COURT AND. 
THE COURT: THAT'S JUST CALLED RULING AT THIS POINT 
IT'S NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
MR. WILSON: NOW. DO WE NEED TO COMBINE THE TWO. 
THE COURT: PROBABLY WOULD BE WISE TO REFER TO THE 
EARLIER RULING AND INCORPORATE IT BY REFERENCE INTO THE TO 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT YOU ARE PREPARING. 
MR. WILSON: OKAY. 
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THE COURT: IF THAT MAKE SENSE. 
MR. WILSON: I THINK IT DOES. 
THE COURT: SO YOU'LL HAVE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND PROBABLY WANT TO REFERENCE THAT IN 
BOTH PLACES OF THAT DOCUMENT. 
MR. WILSON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: ANY OTHER QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO YOUR 
ASSIGNMENT, MR. WILSON. 
MR. WILSON: NO. I GUESS THERE WAS ONE OTHER ITEM 
AND THAT WAS THE COST, THAT THEY WERE REQUESTING COSTS AND OF 
COURSE WE DON'T TAKE ISSUE WITH THAT. I THINK THE STATUTE'S 
CLEAR THAT AS THE PREVAILING PARTY THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR 
COST. I THINK THAT WAS SET OUT. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU 
WERE INTENDING TO AMEND THE COSTS, DAVE, OR NOT. I ASSUME 
YOU PROBABLY INCURRED ADDITIONAL COSTS IN PURSUING THE 
MOTION. 
MR. IRVINE: THERE WOULD BE SOME, MEL. I DON'T KNOW 
AT THE MOMENT HOW SIGNIFICANT THEY ARE, BUT I CAN GET THAT 
INFORMATION TO YOU. 
MR. WILSON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU DO THAT 'CAUSE YOU ARE EXACTLY 
RIGHT. THAT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT I ANALYZED FRESH LAST 
NIGHT. BUT WE WOULD WANT TO INCLUDE THAT IN THE JUDGMENT. 
THAT SHOULD BE SET UP FAIRLY CLEARLY IN THE STATUTE. WOULD 
YOU TWO WORK ON THAT. 
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MR. WILSON: IF I RECALL, IN LOOKING AT THE ORIGINAL 
AFFIDAVIT, I DON'T THINK WE HAD ANY QUESTION THAT AS TO THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE COSTS AS FAR AS THAT GOES. IF YOU WANT TO 
GIVE ME AN UPDATED ACCOUNTING ON THAT, DAVE, I'LL BE HAPPY TO 
INCORPORATE THAT INTO THE ORDER TOO. 
MR. IRVINE: NOW, LET ME JUST MENTION THIS FOR WHAT 
IT MAY BE WORTH. I'M GOING TO BE LEAVING THE COUNTRY ABOUT 
MIDWEEK NEXT WEEK, AND I WILL BE BACK THE 25TH. 
MR. WILSON: 25TH OF AUGUST. 
MR. IRVINE: YEAH, SO — 
MR. WILSON: I'LL TRY AND SEND THESE BEFORE YOU 
LEAVE, BUT I DON'T KNOW IF I CAN GET THEM OUT THAT QUICKLY. 
MR. IRVINE: IF YOU DON'T GET THEM BEFORE I GO, I 
WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULDN'T SUBMIT THEM TO ME UNTIL I 
GET BACK. 
MR. WILSON: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. JUST HOLD THEM UNTIL 
YOU GET BACK AND THEN SUBMIT THEM TO YOU. 
THE COURT: IN FACT, I'D ASK YOU TO DO THAT ALSO SO 
THAT WE'RE NOT 4-501 — SO THAT THEY ARE NOT SUBMITTED AND 
THEN THE TIME PASSES. I'D RATHER HAVE THEM SUBMITTED AFTER 
MR. IRVINE HAS A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THEM. 
MR. WILSON: I APPRECIATE THAT. 
THE COURT: WELL, COUNSEL, LET ME SAY THIS. IT'S 
BEEN A PLEASURE TO WORK WITH THE THREE OF YOU, AND I KNOW 
THAT YOU HAVEN'T AGREED WITH MY DECISION SOME OF THE TIMES 
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AND I'M JUST DOING MY BEST AS A — AND ADMIT TO MY HUMAN 
NATURE, BUT I DO WANT TO EXPRESS WHAT A PLEASURE IT HAS BEEN 
TO WORK WITH YOU THREE AND HOPE TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
WORK WITH EACH OF YOU AGAIN AND WISH YOU FOLKS AND THE 
PARTIES THE BEST. 
MR. WILSON: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. 
MR. WILSON: APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE AND ALSO I 
REALIZE IT'S A DIFFICULT PROCESS FOR YOU. 
THE COURT: WELL, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, JOANNE PRATT, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
PROCEEDINGS, VIDEOTAPED AT THE TIME OF THEIR OCCURRENCE, WERE 
SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCED BY ME TO PRINTED TRANSCRIPT FORM AS 
HEREINBEFORE APPEARING; 
THAT I WAS NOT PRESENT AT ANY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
HEREINBEFORE REPRESENTED; 
BUT THAT SAID TRANSCRIPTION CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND 
CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY 
ABILITY TO SO TRANSCRIBE; 
it DATED THISM DAY OF 200^. 
/U-tAAJl $M*±t-
JOANNE PRATT, RPR 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 19. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CODE 
CHAPTER 4. SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 
Copyright ©2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
19-4-111 Fluorine added to water -Election required. 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, public water supplies, whether state, county, municipal, or 
district, shall not have fluorine or any of its derivatives or compounds added to them without the approval of a 
majority of voters in an election in the area affected. An election shall be held upon the: 
(a) filing of an initiative petition requesting the action in accordance with state law governing initiative petitions; 
(b) in the case of a municipal, special district, or county water system, passage of a resolution by the legislative 
body or special district board representing the affected voters, submitting the question to the affected voters at the 
next regular general election or municipal general election; or 
(c) in a county of the first or second class, passage of a resolution by the county legislative body to place an 
opinion question relating to all public water systems within the county, except as provided in Subsection (2), on the 
ballot at the next general election. 
(2) If a majority of voters on an opinion question under Subsection (l)(c) approve the addition of fluorine to the 
public water supplies within the county, the local health departments shall require the addition of fluorine to all 
public water supplies within that county other than those systems: 
(a) that are functionally separate from any other public water systems in that county; and 
(b) where a majority of the voters served by the public water system voted against the addition of fluorine on the 
opinion question under Subsection (l)(c). 
(3) Nothing contained in this section prohibits the addition of chlorine or other water purifying agents. 
(4) Any political subdivision which, prior to November 2, 1976, decided to and was adding fluorine or any of its 
derivatives or compounds to the drinking water is considered to have complied with Subsection (1). 
History: C. 1953, 26-12-12, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, § 13; renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 95; 1998, ch. 
301, § 1; 2000, ch. 181, § 1; 2002, ch. 291, § 9. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. -The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, subdivided former Subsection (1) by adding 
the Subsection (3) designation before the former third sentence; in Subsection (1) deleted "or any other 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Oris. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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UTST§ 19-4-111 Page 2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 19-4-111 
medications" after "compounds" in the first sentence and substituted "be held upon the" for "not be held unless an 
initiative petition has been filed requesting the action in accordance with state law governing initiative petitions" at 
the end of the last sentence; added Subsections (l)(a) to (l)(c) and (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as (4); 
and substituted "considered" for "deemed" in Subsection (4). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, inserted "regular" and "or municipal general election" in 
Subsection (l)(b); in Subsection (l)(c) substituted "first or second class" for "first class," inserted "except as 
provided in Subsection (2)," and made a minor stylistic change; in the introductory sentence of Subsection (2) 
substituted "all public water supplies" for "the public water supplies" and added "other than those systems"; and 
added Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b). 
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, substituted "legislative body" for "commission" in Subsection 
(D(c). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 19-4-111 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 19. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CODE 
CHAPTER 4. SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 
19-4-111 Fluorine added to or removed from water --Election required. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection 19-4-104 (1) (a) (i) , public water 
supplies, whether state, county, municipal, or district, may not have fluorine 
or any of its derivatives or compounds added to or removed from them without 
the approval of a majority of voters in an election in the area affected. 
(b) An election shall be held: 
(i) upon the filing of an initiative petition requesting the action in 
accordance with state law governing initiative petitions; 
(ii) in the case of a municipal, special district, or county water system 
which is functionally separate from any other water system, upon the 
passage of a resolution by the legislative body or special district board 
representing the affected voters, submitting the question to the affected 
voters at a municipal general election; or 
(iii) in a county of the first or second class, upon the passage of a 
resolution by the county legislative body to place an opinion question 
relating to all public water systems within the county, except as provided 
in Subsection (2), on the ballot at a general election. 
(2) If a majority of voters on an opinion question under Subsection (1) (b) (iii) 
approve the addition of fluorine to or the removal of fluorine from the public 
water supplies within the county, the local health departments shall require the 
addition of fluorine to or the removal of fluorine from all public water supplies 
within that county other than those systems: 
(a) that are functionally separate from any other public water systems in that 
county; and 
(b) where a majority of the voters served by the public water system voted 
against the addition or removal of fluorine on the opinion question under 
Subsection (1) (b) (iii) . 
(3) Nothing contained in this section prohibits the addition of chlorine or other 
water purifying agents. 
(4) Any political subdivision which, prior to November 2, 1976, decided to and was 
adding fluorine or any of its derivatives or compounds to the drinking water is 
considered to have complied with Subsection (1) . 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(5) In an election held pursuant to Subsections (l)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), where a 
majority of the voters approve the addition to or removal of fluorine from the 
public water supplies, no election to consider removing fluorine from or adding 
fluorine to the public water supplies shall be held for a period of four years 
from the date of approval by the majority of voters beginning with elections held 
in November 2 000. 
(6) For purposes of this section, "removal" means ceasing to add fluorine to a 
public water supply, the addition having been previousLy approved by the voters of 
a political subdivision. 
History: C. 1953, 26-12-12, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, § 13; renumbered by L. 
1991, ch. 112, § 95; 1998, ch. 301, § 1; 2000, ch. 181, § 1; 2002, ch. 291, § 9; 
2003, ch. 185, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, inserted "regular" 
and "or municipal general election" in Subsection (1) (b) ; in Subsection (1) (c) 
substituted "first or second class" for "first class," inserted "except as 
provided in Subsection (2)," and made a minor stylistic change; in the 
introductory sentence of Subsection (2) substituted "all public water supplies" 
for "the public water supplies" and added "other than those systems"; and added 
Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b). 
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, substituted "legislative body" for 
"commission" in Subsection (l)(c). 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added the proviso at the beginning of 
Subsection (1) ; inserted "or removed from" in Subsection (1) (a) ; in Subsection 
(l)(b), inserted "which is functionally separate from any other water system" and 
substituted "a municipal general election" for "the next regular general election 
or municipal general election"; substituted "a general election" for "the next 
general election" in Subsection (i)(b)(iii); in Subsection [2), added "or the 
removal of fluoride from" or a form thereof three times; added Subsections (5) and 
(6); and updated related internal references throughout. 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
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APPENDIX H 
Stewart Decision Elements 
Element 
Prepared by Plaintiff UBDHD in Aid of Argument 
Evidence Reference 
• The people adopt an 
important, significant 
public law. 
• Vindication of Davis 
County's voters' constitutional 
rights. 
Voters approve fluoridation, 52% to 48% 
(85,353 total votes; 44,403 in favor, 
40,950 opposed). 
Ruling, 12, p. 3 
To allow unlawful Initiative Petition on ballot would Ruling, p. 8 
render referenda provisions in the Utah Constitution and 
Utah Code meaningless. 
• Vindication of a strong and 
important public policy. 
• Plaintiff conferred a substantial Allowing the unlawful Initiative Petition to be placed on Ruling, p. 10 
benefit on an ascertainable class. ballot would subvert Davis County voters by allowing 
petition sponsors to misuse the people's direct 
legislative power to thwart the will of a majority of 
Davis County voters. 
The very integrity of the people's direct legislative Ruling, p . 11 
power is at issue for plaintiff. 
If the Court allowed the Initiative Petition to be placed Ruling, p. 11 
on the ballot, the lawful vote of a majority of Davis 
County residents would be nullified by an unlawful 
and untimely local initiative. 
• Plaintiff conferred a substantial The public, and Davis County voters in particular, have Ruling, p. 11 
benefit on all Davis County voters, a real and substantial interest in ensuring that the laws 
of initiative and referenda are scrupulously followed, 
and that the election process adheres to the rule of law. 
Element Evidence Reference 
• Plaintiff successfully vindicated Because of the important and unique issues involved in 
the rights of Davis County voters this lawsuit, the Court finds that the public interest is 
under exceptional circumstances advanced by issuing an injunction, 
that are unique and extraordinary. 
Ruling, p. 11 
• Key public officers and entities 
responsible for deciding whether 
to place the petition on the ballet 
were petition signers, and did 
not disclose that conflict in the 
Commission's 8 /6 /02 meeting 
• The majority who voted for 
fluoridation were left on 
their own. 
The Clerk, the Commission Chair, and the County 
Attorney all signed the unlawful petition and 
failed to disclose that conflict prior to the Commission's 
August 6, 2002 meeting where the petition was 
allowed to go on the ballot. 
Neither the Clerk, the Commission, nor the County 
Attorney would advocate or defend the vote of the 
majority in the 2000 election or the law the majority 
enacted. 
Ex. 1, Supp. Aff. of 
Troy Rawlings, Comm. Min. 
8/6/02; S. Rawlings Aff., p . 14 
Pltf. Ex. 2, Stan. Exam. 8 /7 /02 
8/7/02; 
Ex. 17, Aff. of S. Rawlings 
Ex. 1, Aff. of T. Rawlings 
Pltf. Ex. 2, Stan. Exam. 8 /7/02 
• The County would not pay 
to defend the majority's 
enactment of a new law. 
• The Clerk failed to properly 
vet the unlawful petition. 
• The Clerk ignored his duty to 
protect ballot integrity. 
• The Commission failed to 
protect ballot integrity. 
All of the legal costs to defend the unlawful petition 
and nullify the majority's vote were paid by the 
County taxpayers. 
The Clerk did not seek proper legal advice to determine 
whether the petition was lawful when it was filed in 
July 2002, and what advice he received was inadequate. 
The Clerk diet not understand that he had a duty to 
ascertain the petition's lawfulness at the time of 
filing, or he ignored it. 
The Commission did not understand that it had a duty 
to ascertain the petition's lawfulness before allowing 
it on the ballot, or the Commission ignored it. 
T. Rawlings Aff, p. 3 
County Attorney is sole 
counsel for defendant 
S. Rawlings Aff., p. 16,1f 25 
T. Rawlings Aff., p. 2, 3, 4,15 
Supp. Aff. of T. Rawlings, «H4-6 
Ex 17, Aff. of S. Rawlings 
T. Rawlings Aff, p. 15 
Ex. 17, Aff. of S. Rawlings 
S. Rawlings Aff., p 16,% 25 
Ex. 1, Supp Aff. of T. Rawlings 
Pltf. Ex. 2, Stan. Exam. 8 /7/02 
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Element Evidence Reference 
• The petition was forwarded as 
an initiative because of bias. 
The Clerk's personal opposition to fluoridation, as 
manifested by his self-appointed, unauthorized role of 
fluoridation cost overseer in the fall of 2000 (1); his use 
of the County Voter Information Pamphlet as a personal 
editorial forum (2); his failure to include any referred 
issue except fluoridation in the Voter Information 
Pamphlet (3); and his antipathy toward the proponents 
of fluoridation (4) so affected his objectivity that he 
failed to perform his statutory duty to assure the 
integrity of the ballot by adequately vetting the 
petition presented to him for verification and filing 
in July 2002 (5). 
(1) S. Rawlings Aff., Iff 9-15,17,18, 
20, 29-32, 36, 37; and p. 2; Ex. 16 
(2) Comm. Min.; Ex. 15, S. Rawlings 
Aff, p. 3; B. Beck Aff., f 6-7, 9-12 
(3) Comm. Min.; Ex. 15, S. Rawlings 
Aff.; UCA § 20A-7-402; 
(4) T. Rawlings Aff., p. 17; B. Beck 
Aff., f 2,12; S. Rawlings Aff., 
Ex. 3, 4, 5, 7 
(5) S. Rawlings Aff., f 25, p.16 and 
Ex. 17; T. Rawlings Aff., p. 2,15; 
T. Rawlings Supp. Aff. f 2, 4 
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